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Firms’ participation in exporting or foreign direct investment is an extremely 
rare behavior: only 4 percent of over 5.5 million U.S. firms were exporters in 2000. 
Exporters are generally larger (e.g. output and employment) and more productive 
than firms serving only domestic markets.    Such heterogeneity within a narrowly 
defined industry cannot be fully explained by either comparative advantage 
arguments or the presence of scale economies and consumers’ love of variety.  
Recent studies of heterogeneous firms show that a reduction in trade costs, i.e. policy, 
geographic and institutional barriers, has two effects within an industry previously 
not recognized in trade literature: (i) exit of low productivity firms, and (ii) resource 
reallocation in favor of high productivity firms.    These two effects combine to raise 
an industry’s average productivity and overall welfare, but can adversely affect some 
regions of an economy with firm closures or job losses. 
The objective of this dissertation is to examine the effects of trade costs on firm 
entry, exit, and employment at a regional level in the United States.    For this  
purpose, industry-specific trade costs by U.S. regions are derived and their 
underlying sources are examined.    The chosen trade-costs measure, based on the 
gravity equation, captures the variation over time in trade fictions among countries.   
Data from the Census Bureau and the World Bank are employed to quantify trade 
costs by U.S. industries and regions.    Results show that a single measure of trade 
costs for the United States does not adequately represent the large number of and 
diverse regions through which trade in agriculture and manufacturing occurs.  
Moreover, geographic factors appear to be relatively more important than policy 
barriers in explaining the level of trade costs faced by U.S. regions. 
Drawing on recent heterogeneous firms models, this dissertation specifies an 
empirical framework to examine: (i) firm entry or exit arising from changes in trade 
costs, i.e. extensive margin, and (ii) changes in employment of surviving firms 
creation arising from changes in trade costs, i.e. intensive margin.    These two 
hypotheses are tested using regional business dynamics data from the Census Bureau 
and trade cost measures derived earlier.    Results show that trade cost changes affect 
firm exit and employment as hypothesized.    That is, lowering trade costs increases 
the likelihood of firm exit, presumably of the low-productivity ones.  Thus, trade 
costs, by way of the extensive margin, affect an industry’s average productivity.   
Similarly, trade costs appear to affect the employment of surviving firms suggesting 
that the intensive margin also operates to improve average productivity of an  
industry, such as through resource reallocation towards high-productivity firms. 
The intra-industry reallocation of resources to high productivity firms is an 
important source of gains from trade to the whole economy.    Nonetheless, some 
regions face firm exit and job losses.    In assessing the gains from trade, attention 
must be paid to the distributional consequences of resource reallocation within an 
industry as well as a country. 
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TRADE COSTS AND BUSINESS DYNAMICS IN U.S. REGIONS AND 
INDUSTRIES 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
       2 
 
 
Globalization is increasingly integrating economies, yet not every component of 
most nations’ economies is participating.    At the firm level, export participation and 
overseas sales remain highly concentrated: only 4 percent of over 5.5 million U.S. 
firms were exporters in 2000.    Exporters are generally larger (e.g. output and 
employment) and more productive than firms serving only domestic markets 
(Bernard et al., 1995; Clerides et al., 1998; Aw et al., 2000).    Such heterogeneity    
within a narrowly defined industry cannot be fully explained by either comparative 
advantage arguments or the presence of scale economies and consumers’ love of 
variety (Krugman, 1980).    In a seminal article, Melitz (2003) models an industry 
characterized by firm heterogeneity arising from productivity differentials among 
firms.    In such an industry, Melitz (2003) shows that trade liberalization has two 
important effects: (i) increases in average industry productivity, and (ii) resource 
reallocation in favor of high productivity firms.    Further extending the 
heterogeneous firms model, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) derive the spatial pattern of 
firm entry, exit and survival within a country with specific attention to the effects of 
declining international trade costs, i.e. trade and geographic barriers, and regional 
competition.    The examination of trade-cost induced spatial reorganization of 
resources is important for a better understanding of globalization’s effects on 
regional economic development. 
The objective of this dissertation is to examine the effects of trade costs on firm     3 
 
 
entry, exit, and employment at a regional level in the United States.    For this 
purpose, Chapters 2 and 3 derive a measure of industry-specific trade costs by U.S. 
regions and examine its sources, respectively.    The chosen trade-costs measure is 
based on the micro-founded gravity equation from a general equilibrium framework 
(Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003).    It not only captures the variation over time in 
trade fictions among countries, but also allows for further examination of their 
underlying sources: policy, geographical and institutional factors.  Data from the 
Census Bureau’s U.S. Exports of Merchandise and U.S. Imports of Merchandise and 
WISERTrade database are employed to quantify trade costs by U.S. regions.    These 
two chapters show that a single measure of trade costs may not adequately represent 
the large number of and diverse regions through which trade in agriculture and 
manufacturing occurs.  Moreover, geographic factors appear to be important than 
policy barriers in explaining the level of trade costs faced by U.S. regions. 
Chapter 4 lays out a conceptual framework to examine the effect of trade costs, 
computed in Chapters 2 and 3, on firm entry, exit and employment patterns.    This 
framework draws on Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) to specify an 
empirical framework in Chapter 5 for examining: (i) firm entry or exit arising from 
changes in trade costs, i.e. extensive margin, and (ii) changes in employment of 
surviving firms arising from changes in trade costs, i.e. intensive margin.    Chapter 5 
also shows how these two hypotheses are tested using regional business dynamics     4 
 
 
data from the Census Bureau and corresponding trade cost measures.    Results show 
that trade cost changes affect firm entry, exit and employment as hypothesized.   
That is, lowering trade costs increases the likelihood of firm exit, presumably of the 
low-productivity ones.  Thus, trade costs, by way of the extensive margin, affect an 
industry’s average productivity.    Similarly, trade costs appear to affect the 
employment of surviving firms suggesting that the intensive margin also operates to 
improve average productivity of an industry, such as through resource reallocation 
towards high-productivity firms. 
This thesis is organized in eight additional chapters after the introduction.    In 
Chapter 2, bilateral trade costs at the region level are derived.    In addition, Chapter 2 
illustrates the variation over 1998-2009 in trade frictions among three-digit NAICS 
industries, major U.S. customs districts, and major U.S. trade partners.    Chapter 3 
examines the underlying sources of bilateral trade costs.   Chapter 4 illustrates the 
conceptual framework of intra-industry extensive margin and intensive margin in the 
presence of heterogeneous firms.    Chapter 5 presents available data for examining 
the extensive and intensive margin changes at the U.S. state level.    The estimation 
framework and results on trade cost effects on these two margins, controlling for 
market size and other related factors, are discussed in Chapter 6 and 7, respectively.   
A discussion of welfare effects of trade reform and the contribution of this dissertation 
is made in Chapter 8.    Summary and conclusions are provided in Chapter 9.       5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
2. MEASURING BILATERAL TRADE COSTS OF U.S. REGIONS 
       6 
 
 
Over the past few decades, globalization has changed the costs of exchanging goods 
and services among nations.    In some industries, lower trade costs arise from either 
declining tariffs and related policy barriers or falling transportation, communication 
and information costs.  For instance, Hummels (2007) finds that declining 
international transportation costs led to a rapid growth in global manufacturing trade 
in the last few decades.    In contrast, other industries may experience increasing trade 
costs due to a variety of reasons, e.g. regulatory or tariff policy changes.    For 
example, following the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, substantial security 
and other regulations have likely raised the cost of trading for the United States and its 
trade partners (Peterson and Treat, 2008).    Moreover, changes in trade costs may vary 
by partner country and port of entry.    For example, the Economist (2004) notes that 
several U.S. ports face considerable infrastructural problems.    Measuring trade costs 
and the effect of their changes on resource reallocation across and within countries is 
receiving significant research attention due to their implications for economic growth 
and development (Baier and Bergstrand, 2001; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004; 
Bernard et al., 2006; Jacks et al., 2011).     
Previous research has measured trade costs directly from data on tariffs and 
freight rates (Bernard et al., 2006; Hummels, 2007; Blonigen and Wilson, 2008).    For 
instance, Bernard et al. (2006) construct U.S. industry-level trade costs, which are 
equal to the sum of costs associated with ad valorem duty and ad valorem freight and     7 
 
 
insurance.    The former is measured by the ratio of collected duties over the 
free-on-board (fob) customs value of import, and the latter is measured by the 
difference between cost-insurance-freight (cif) value and fob value relative to the fob 
value.    Unlike aggregate policy-based barriers, the above measure of trade costs 
accounts for heterogeneity among industries.    However, data constraints continue to 
hamper the measurement of trade costs at the industry level (Chen and Novy, 2009).   
For example, Bernard et al. (2006) measure only import trade costs since comparable 
data on the export side remain elusive.    Additionally, previous measures are 
constrained in accounting for institutional factors, e.g. customs regulations or port 
operations/efficiency, which affect trade costs (Hausman et al., 2005; Blonigen and 
Wilson, 2008).    Thus, the lack of time series data on applied tariffs as well as 
systematic cross-country information on logistics limits direct measurement of trade 
cost levels and changes.    Such measures are almost always incomplete. 
This study focuses on measuring region-level trade costs faced by U.S. 
agricultural and manufacturing industries using an indirect approach.    Trade costs 
here refer to all factors limiting the movement of goods and services across countries, 
including handling and transportation costs, tariffs and other barriers (Eaton and 
Kortum, 2002; Bernard et al., 2006).    To overcome the data constraints noted earlier, 
the gravity approach of Jacks et al. (2011) is applied here to measure trade costs for 
U.S. industries and regions (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Head and Ries, 2001;     8 
 
 
Chen and Novy 2009).    Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) show that trade flows 
depend on not only bilateral trade frictions but also on average trade barriers with 
other countries, i.e. multilateral resistance.    Chen and Novy (2009) provide an 
analytical solution to multilateral resistance which allows for the derivation of 
bilateral trade frictions or costs relative to domestic trade costs from a parsimonious 
gravity specification.    Furthermore, this approach captures the variation over time in 
bilateral trade costs and allows for an examination of their sources: policy, geographic, 
and institutional factors.   
In the case of the United States, a national measure of trade costs does not 
adequately account for the large number of and diverse regions through which trade in 
agriculture and manufacturing occurs.    The United States reports 42 customs districts 
for export and import of goods, with many in the mid-west, e.g. Minneapolis, St. 
Louis (Foreign Trade Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau).    For instance, trade costs with 
Canada can be much lower relative to Mexico for the state of Washington, while the 
opposite scenario may arise for Texas or Arizona.    Hence, this study applies the 
gravity framework for measuring trade costs to a regional setting for both agricultural 
and manufacturing industries.    Moreover, the sources of trade costs -policy, 
geographic, and institutional factors- are examined.    As de Groot et al. (2004) note, 
institutional variation is an important element of informal barriers to trade that has a 
significant, positive, and substantial influence on bilateral trade volumes.  For the     9 
 
 
determinants of trade costs, this study first considers variables commonly used in the 
gravity literature including geographic proximity (distance between trading partners, 
common borders), trade policy (tariffs), and institutional factors (common language).  
In addition, the effect of port logistics on trade costs, which has received limited 
attention in the empirical trade literature, is examined.    The few studies that focus on 
logistics explore its relationship to trade volumes, e.g. Hausman et al. (2005) report 
significant and positive effects of port logistics performance on global bilateral trade 
(Nordas et al., 2004; Djankov et al., 2006). 
 
2.1 Conceptual Framework 
The basic framework to measure trade costs is Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) 
general equilibrium framework for a micro-founded gravity equation.    Here, bilateral 
trade volume is specified as a function of trade barriers (geographic and policy) after 
controlling for both countries’ size (Feenstra et al., 2001).    In this study, the above 
framework is extended to a country with multiple regions as follows.    First, the range 
of all consumers and products in the world is assumed to be in the continuum [0, 1], 
while there are a finite number of regions.   Second, each region i is endowed with the 
range of differentiated varieties [ni-1, ni], and each variety is produced by a single firm.   
Within the product range, [ni-1, ni-1+si(ni-ni-1)] is tradable and the rest is non-tradable 
across countries and regions, where si denotes the exogenous fraction of tradable     10 
 
 
goods. 
Based on the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preference, a Dixit-Stiglitz 
composite consumption index of region j is specified as: 
   
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where σ denotes the elasticity of substitution between all goods;    k denotes variety;   
cjk represents the per capita consumption of variety k in region j.    The total 
consumption of a representative resident in region j, Cj , includes tradable goods from 
all countries (bracketed term in equation (2.1)) and non-tradable goods from his/her 
own region. 
The budget constraint for each individual in region j is as follows: 
(2.2)                                       ,  j j j PC w 
 
where wj denotes the nominal income per capita at region j;    and Pj represents a 
consumption-based price index defined by: 
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where qjk is the price of region i goods faced by region j consumers.    With q as the 
price faced by consumers and p as the exporter supply price, the following 
relationships hold: 
1 1 1
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where tij measures trade costs between regions i and j and tjj measures domestic trade 
costs within region j. 
Maximizing the per capita consumption index (2.1) subject to the budget 
constraint (2.2) yields the nominal individual demand of product k at region j, xjk, as 
follows: 
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In the general equilibrium system, the market clearing conditions require that total 
income equal total consumption for each region:
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Furthermore, region i’s total income yi has two parts: sum of nominal consumption by 
other regions ( ij
ji
z
  ), and the total nominal consumption by local residents (zii) as 
follows: 
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Following Deardorff (1998), zij and zii are solved for in the general equilibrium      
structure of the gravity model.    For this purpose, supply price pik is normalized to one.   
Then,       12 
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where yi, yj, yw representative the total income of region i, region j, and total world as 
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Furthermore, in Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) terms, Пi and Pj represents 
outward and inward multilateral resistance defined by 
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where Пi is an index of trade costs (tij’s) that origin i faces on its exporting goods 
shipping to all other regions (outward multilateral resistance).    Likewise Pj, 
consumer price index, is also an index of trade costs (tij’s) that destination j faces on 
importing goods shipped from all other regions (inward multilateral resistance).  
Hence, tij represents bilateral resistance, while ПiPj represents multilateral resistance,     13 
 
 
and the ratio of tij and ПiPj can measure the relative multilateral resistance.
  In empirical applications, appropriate proxies for multilateral resistance variables 
have eluded previous research, e.g. some studies use country fixed effects.    However, 
Jacks et al. (2011) provide a solution to ПiPj that allows for empirical application of 
equations (2.9) and (2.10).    First, zji and zjj are derived as follows:   
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where the right hand side contains the product of relative trade costs between region i 
and j.    Trade costs is then defined as the geometric average of two trade cost ratios, 
which captures the bilateral trade costs relative to domestic trade costs:
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where σ is the elasticity of substitution, which is greater than unity.    This study     14 
 
 
employs equation (2.20) to measure U.S. region-level relative bilateral trade costs, 
broadly defined to include policy, geographic, and institutional factors limiting trade.   
Intuitively, as the bilateral trade volume between each trade pair increases, controlling 
for international trade (multilateral resistance), trade frictions are expected to be lower 
and vice versa.    The difference between the total output and total export is interpreted 
as ‘market potential,’ which is the potentially tradable output of a region but not yet 
traded (Coughlin and Novy 2009).    When the market potential of region i 
(OUTPUTi-EXPi) increases with all else equal – which means that the given region 
absorbs more goods domestically without simultaneously demanding more goods 
from other countries – trade costs increase as well. 
 
2.2 Trade Costs during 1998-2009 
This section first details data used in measuring bilateral trade costs for each major 
U.S. customs district with each trading partner as in equation (2.20), but extended in 
two additional dimensions: industry (each three-digit North American Industrial 
Classification System, NAICS) and time (1998-2009).    That is, the trade-costs 
measure is indexed by: importer (i/j), exporter (j/i), industry (s) and time (t).    Then, 
using trade volume as weight, this study examines how trade costs vary during 
1998-2009 for each three-digit NAICS industry, each major U.S. customs district and 
each U.S. trade partner. 
     15 
 
 
2.2.1 Data Description: 
For computing trade costs, this study considers 38 major U.S. customs districts located 
in the contiguous United States, 72 countries and 25 three-digit NAICS level 
industries during 1998-2009
1.    There are 1426 region-country pairs in total.   
Equation (2.20) can be rewritten with y and z referring to total values of output 
(OUTPUT) and exports (EXP), respectively, as follows: 
  
1
2( 1)
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s
ist ist jst jst
ijst
ijst ijst
OUTPUT EXP OUTPUT EXP
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

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where i denotes each major U.S. district; j denotes foreign countries that are trade 
partners of district i; s denotes three-digit NAICS industries; t denotes time.  For σi, 
this study employs estimates of elasticities for each four-digit NACE rev.1 industry 
from Chen and Novy (2009).    Using the concordance file between four-digit NACE 
rev.1 and three-digit NAICS industries, the corresponding elasticity of substitution for 
each three-digit NAICS industry is identified.
 
Two alternative databases are used to obtain bilateral trade data, denominated in 
U.S. dollars, between major U.S. district i and foreign country j.    The primary 
sources are the U.S. Exports of Merchandise and U.S. Imports of Merchandise from 
the Foreign Trade Statistics of U.S. Census Bureau.    The former database 
characterizes the current value of commodities identified by the ten-digit Harmonized 
System (HS) Schedule B Classification from a U.S. customs district (i) to each final     16 
 
 
destination (j).    The import database provides the value of commodities from the 
origin to both the entry point and port of unloading.    Both databases incorporate the 
concordance files between ten-digit HS code and six-digit NAICS or five-digit SITC 
code.    According to the concordance files, each ten-digit HS commodity can be 
mapped into a six-digit NAICS code.    Summing up the import and export values 
from six-digit to three-digit NAICS level, this study derives bilateral trade flows for 
each trade partner during 1998-2009.    A second source of bilateral trade data by U.S. 
regions or states is the WISERTrade database, where the state of origin of movement 
and state of ultimate destination are recorded (U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade).   
However, import by state and industry is available for only 2008 and 2009.    Hence, 
we employ the WISERTrade data to perform sensitivity analysis of trade costs 
measured using data from the U.S. Exports of Merchandise and U.S. Imports of 
Merchandise.   
The numerator of equation (2.21) requires the total output data at the three-digit 
NAICS industry level for both U.S. regions and their trade partners.    For the 72 trade 
partners, the Industrial Demand-Supply Balance (IDSB) database of United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) is the source of output data, 
dominated in U.S. dollars, at the four-digit ISIC level.    Using the concordance files 
from the U.S. Census Bureau, data from IDSB database are mapped into the 
three-digit NAICS level to estimate OUTPUTjst. The industry-specific export data of     17 
 
 
foreign countries (EXPjst) is taken from the UN COMTRADE database, which 
provides trade at the six-digit HS level.   
For each U.S. region, the total export data (EXPist) is readily obtained by 
aggregating bilateral trade volume (EXPijst) over 72 partner countries from U.S. 
Exports of Merchandise (and WISERTrade).    However, data on industry-specific 
output for each U.S. region are not available.    Hence, this study estimates OUTPUTist 
in two steps.    In the first step, annual regional GDP, i.e. value added, by industry are 
obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of U.S. Department of Commerce for 
1998-2009.    In the second step, the Manufacturing Industry Productivity Database 
from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) is used to convert value 
added into gross output.    The NBER database has both value-added and total 
shipping data at six-digit NAICS level, which provides the ratio of total output relative 
to value added for aggregate United States.    Assuming that the national ratio applies 
to each region (i.e. identical intermediate input cost shares across regions), the product 
of annual GDP data and the output to value-added ratios is used to estimate 
OUTPUTist in equation (2.21).    The summary statistics of data employed in 
measuring bilateral trade costs are displayed in the top panel of table 2.1. 
 
2.2.2    Trade Costs of Three-Digit NAICS Industries 
Table 2.2 presents relative trade costs weighted by total trade volume (total imports     18 
 
 
and exports) as average levels and growth rates for three periods, 1998-2001, 
2002-2009 and 1998-2009, for each U.S. three-digit NAICS industry.    Focusing 
first on levels, note that on average the U.S. agricultural industries (NAICS 111, 112, 
113 and 114) face much higher weighted average trade costs than manufacturing 
industries.    A level of 2.203 for NAICS 111 indicates that international trade costs 
are about 220.3 percent of the domestic trade costs
2.  While the level of relative 
trade costs for agricultural industries appears to be high, recall that it includes 
transportation costs, trade policy and institutional factors including port efficiency 
and logistics.    From this point forward, the term ‘relative’ is dropped in the 
following discussion to focus on levels, changes and trends.  Since most 
agricultural commodities are either bulky or perishable or both, they tend to have 
high transportation costs per unit value and are subject to delivery time constraints, 
and hence, face high trade costs.    Moreover, agricultural industries tend to have 
higher border protection relative to others (Reimer and Li, 2010).    In addition, high 
trade costs may arise from policies protecting natural resources (e.g., the Endangered 
Species Act).    Among agricultural industries, the forest products industry (113) and 
the animal production industry (112) has the highest and lowest average trade costs, 
respectively.   
The heterogeneity of trade costs among the manufacturing industries is apparent 
in table 2.2.    Trade costs range from a high of 1.752 for NAICS 312, beverages and     19 
 
 
tobacco, to 1.292 for NAICS 333, machinery manufacturing.    Industries categorized 
by bulky products (not necessarily perishable) include beverages and tobacco, paper 
(322), chemicals (325) and non-metallic mineral products (327), e.g. stone, clay, glass 
and concrete products, face high trade costs.    Most other industries appear to have 
trade costs of about 1.450, which, as noted earlier include transportation costs, trade 
policy and institutional factors.    The relatively lower ratio of international trade costs 
to domestic trade costs in manufacturing industries (1.450) likely contributed to the 
increased volume and value of trade among developed countries in such goods, as 
noted by Hummels (2007).   
The growth rate of weighted average trade costs during 1998-2009 is shown in 
the last column of table 2.2 accompanied by that in two sub-samples: 1998-2001 and 
2002-2009.    The growth rate is calculated in terms of the percent change in trade 
costs of the present period relative to the past period.    The reason for choosing 2001 
as the threshold is the change in the regulatory environment following the terrorist 
attacks on United States (Peterson and Treat, 2008).    During 1998-2001, most 
three-digit NAICS industries witnessed falling trade costs, e.g. leather and allied 
products industry (316), and paper manufacturing industry (322).    Only a few 
industries faced increasing trade costs during 1998-2001, e.g. petroleum and coal 
products (324), and forestry products (113).    By contrast, during 2002-2009 most 
industries faced increasing trade costs, e.g. transportation equipment (336), and     20 
 
 
computers and electronic product (334).    In general, the trade cost levels appear 
consistent with what we might expect given the type of industry.    In turn, most 
industries experience decreasing (increasing) relative trade costs during 1998-2001 
(2002-2009).     
Reasons for increasing trade costs during 2002-2009 may include increased local 
sourcing due to regulatory changes, especially at entry ports after 2001, high energy 
costs, and port logistics performance.    In a review of post-9/11 global regulatory 
framework, Peterson and Treat (2008) discuss the establishment of new protocols for 
tracking and screening cargo entering the United States through road, railway, airport 
and sea port.    Early adopters of U.S. protocols, now incorporated into World Customs 
Organization, include Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Sweden.    While listing 
the new U.S. framework, Peterson and Treat (2008) also outline concerns on its costs 
to business and effects on cross-border trade.    Moreover, the Economist (2004) 
outlined significant infrastructural problems at congested U.S. ports raising concerns 
on free flow of goods between the United States and its trade partners.   
 
2.2.3    Trade Costs of Major U.S. Customs Districts 
Table 2.3 displays trade costs weighted by total trade volume (total imports and 
exports) for each major U.S. customs district and the percentage change during 
1998-2001, 2002-2009, and 1998-2009.    In total, there are 38 major U.S. customs     21 
 
 
districts spread over 28 states.    Among the west coast locations, the Seattle customs 
district in Washington has lower trade costs (1.409 relative trade costs).    Its closeness 
to Canada and Japan, which are two major U.S. trade partners, likely explains the 
lower trade costs.    Of the three customs districts in California, Los Angeles and San 
Diego have trade costs comparable to Seattle.    Meanwhile, San Francisco and 
Columbia-Snake River (Oregon) customs districts have the highest trade costs on the 
west coast.   
In the southern United States, Laredo and El Paso customs districts have lower 
trade costs (1.116 and 1.255, respectively).    This is likely since they are the second 
and the third largest cities on the U.S.-Mexican border, and trade with Mexico is the 
major source of Laredo’s economy.    These two customs districts are not only close to 
the manufacturers in North Mexico, but also have many transportation facilities.    In 
contrast, Nogales in Arizona (1.401) and New Orleans in Louisiana (1.730) have 
relatively high trade costs.   
Among the northern and eastern customs districts, trade costs through Detroit are 
relatively low (1.087).    This may be because the Detroit River connecting the Great 
Lakes plays a critical role in U.S.-Canada (and U.S.-European) trade.    Furthermore, 
Buffalo, Ogdensburg and Pembina also have lower trade costs, likely due to their 
position on the border with Canada.    However, inland cities such as St. Louis (2.263), 
Milwaukee (2.378) and Minneapolis (2.088) face high trade costs.    Along the east     22 
 
 
coast, the average trade costs of customs districts are relatively larger than that of 
customs districts located in the northern, southern and western United States.       
A further issue is how the bilateral trade costs of major U.S. districts vary over 
time.    Table 2.3 provides a comparison over three sub-sample periods.    During 
1998-2001, 26 out of 38 U.S. customs districts experience decreasing relative trade 
costs, with a weighted average decline of 3.61 percent.    Providence had the largest 
decline, at -33.53%.    However, during 2002-2009, the relative trade costs of 17 
customs districts were higher, e.g. Pembina, Baltimore, and Laredo.    Similar to 
results in table 2.2, most customs districts witnessed falling (rising) trade costs during 
1998-2001 (2002-2009).    While the temporal variation in trade costs among U.S. 
customs district mimics that of U.S. industries, some of this variation arises from the 
pattern of trade partners’ adaptation of the post-9/11 U.S. regulatory framework, which 
is discussed in the following.   
 
2.2.4 Bilateral Trade Costs with Major U.S. Trade Partners 
Table 2.4 describes the weighted average U.S. trade costs with 72 partners, which 
include 7, 21, 20 and 13 destinations in Africa, Asia, Europe and North/South America, 
respectively.    The weighted average of trade costs for Africa, Asia, Europe and 
North/South America are 1.947, 1.543, 1.711, and 1.246, respectively.   
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Among the 72 countries, Canada and Mexico have the lowest trade costs with the 
United States (1.168 and 1.215), respectively.    Location advantages combined with 
NAFTA are likely to be important sources of lower trade costs of the United States 
with Canada and Mexico.    Furthermore, U.S. trade costs with Canada are lower than 
those with Mexico.    So, institutional factors such as common language and 
trading/regulatory environment are likely to contribute to Canada’s advantage over 
Mexico.    Most developed countries from Europe have lower trade costs with the 
United States, e.g. Germany (1.603), France (1.695) and United Kingdom (1.625).   
However, less developed European countries such as Lithuania (2.152) and Slovenia 
(2.216) experience relatively larger trade barriers with the United States.   
Among the Asian countries, the four major trade partners – China (1.466), Japan 
(1.532), Korea (1.580) and Malaysia (1.498) – have lower trade costs, when compared 
to some of the European countries (United Kingdom and France).    China also has the 
lowest trade costs with the United States among all Asian countries.    Other emerging 
economies, e.g. India, Indonesia and Israel, have relatively higher trade costs in 
comparison to China.    Note that Kyrgyzstan (2.409), a landlocked and mountainous 
country, faces one of the highest trade costs with the United States.    All seven 
African countries in the sample have high trade costs likely due to geographical, 
political and institutional factors.    An example of this is South Africa (2.935).   
Other countries from North America and South America, except Canada and Mexico,     24 
 
 
have similar but relatively high trade costs.    Among them, Brazil (1.687) and Panama 
(1.720) have low trade costs relative to other South American countries such as 
Ecuador.     
With regard to time series variation of bilateral trade costs, about 60 percent of 
sample countries experienced declining relative trade costs during 1998-2001.   
However, 49 out of 72 countries faced increasing relative trade costs during 
2002-2009.    The two largest U.S. trade partners, Canada and Mexico, illustrate the 
above trend.    Their respective annual trade costs fell by 2.69 and 1.16 percent during 
1998-2001, but increased by 2.86 and 0.38 percent during 2002-2009.    The 
regulatory reasoning noted earlier also explains the relatively lower increases in trade 
costs’ levels for Canada and Mexico.    The Free and Secure (FAST) program, signed 
by the United States, Canada and Mexico in 2002/2003, expedites customs clearance 
for firms operating on U.S.-Canadian and U.S.-Mexican border (Peterson and Treat, 
2008).    Most developed countries from Europe, e.g. United Kingdom, France and 
Ireland, and several Asian trade partners, e.g. Japan, and Korea, show trends similar to 
Canada and Mexico.    Again, the 2004 U.S.-EU Mutual Assistance program aims at 
recognizing and harmonizing each other’s customs procedures.    While U.S. trade 
costs with China fell by 2.81 percent during 1998-2001, they only rose slightly during 
2002-2009 (0.41 percent).    As a result, trade costs with China declined by 1.78 
percent between 1998 and 2009.    Trade costs declined (increased) throughout     25 
 
 
1998-2009 for only a few countries such as Brazil, Chile, Panama and Norway (Israel, 
Senegal and Ukraine). 
 
2.2.5 A Sensitivity Analysis 
The Merchandise Imports and Exports databases report where cargo entered or 
exited the United States, but this may not correspond to where the goods were 
produced or consumed.    In other words, the state of origin of movement and state 
of ultimate destination are unknown.  Los Angeles, for example, trades a quantity 
of goods that exceeds its production of those goods.    To address this concern, this 
study employs the WISERTrade database, which makes a better attempt to attribute 
trade flows to origin/destination states.    Due to limited availability of import data, 
this study can only measure relative trade costs between each U.S. state and its 
trading partner by three-digit NAICS industries during 2008-2009.    So, trade costs 
measured from the WISERTrade database are compared to those from the 
Merchandise Imports and Exports databases for a sensitivity analysis. 
Simple correlation between 
,2008 ijs
M    from the Merchandise Imports and Exports 
database and 
,2008 ijs
W    from WISERTrade database is 0.69 (0.71 for 2009).    To further 
examine these correlations, measures in Table 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 are compared with 
similar measures derived using the WISERTrade database.    The two measures of 
three-digit NAICS industry trade costs (Table 2.2) are highly correlated for both     26 
 
 
2008 and 2009, with the correlation coefficient 0.97 and 0.96, respectively.    In 
addition, the two measures of trade costs for major trade partners are also highly 
correlated (Table 2.4).    The correlation coefficients in the case of trade partners’ 
measures are 0.89 and 0.77 for 2008 and 2009, respectively.    However, the two 
measures for customs districts are not highly correlated during 2008 and 2009 
(correlation coefficient 0.30 and 0.34, respectively).    The relatively lower 
correlation between these two sets of trade costs for customs district is expected 
since the two databases differ in how they record origins and destinations of shipped 
goods.  Overall, the sensitivity analysis suggests that employing the Merchandise 
Imports and Exports databases for computing trade costs by partner or industry 
produces results qualitatively similar to those from the WISERTrade database.   
Improved tracking of origin and final destination, as in the WISERTrade database, is 
needed for precision in measuring regional trade costs in the United States. 
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Table 2.1. Summary Statistics 
 
Panel a: for measuring TCij
3 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum
4  Maximum 
Merchandise imports of major U.S. 
districts (billion) [IMPijs] 
0.049  0.586  0.000  54.783 
Merchandise exports of major U.S. 
districts (billion) [EXPijs] 
0.027  0.310  0.000  38.712 
Total values of output of major 
U.S. districts (billion) [OUTPUTis] 
7.785  11.807  0.001  126.101 
Total exports of major U.S. 
districts (billion) [EXPis] 
1.293  3.166  0.000  40.723 
Total values of output of U.S. trade 
partners (billion) [OUTPUTjs] 
21.634  52.992  0.000  997.033 
Total exports of U.S. trade partners 
(billion) [EXPjs] 
7.668  19.684  0.000  422.829 
Elasticity of substitution [σs]  10.969  2.083  7.100  14.858 
         
Panel b: for sources of TC         
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
Bilateral trade costs  2.509  0.927  0.001  9.812 
Distance(mile)  5423.170  2081.870  546  10610 
Tariff rate of U.S. (%)  2.328  3.902  0  75.141 
Tariff rate of foreign countries (%)  7.412  5.783  0  852.6 
Common border
*  0.024  0.152  0  1 
Common language
*  0.184  0.388  0  1 
Land locked
*5  0.071  0.257  0  1 
Time to import  17.887  10.322  4  76     28 
 
 
Table 2.2. The Industry-Specific Trade Costs During 1998-2009 
 
Three-digit 
NAICS 
Industry 
Average TC 
1998-2009 
Percentage change (%) 
1998-2001  2002-2009  1998-2009 
111  Crop production    2.203  -2.373  0.023  -1.914 
112  Animal production  1.905  -4.674  5.742  4.866 
113  Forestry and logging  2.270  2.547  5.429  10.163 
114  Fishing, hunting and 
Trapping 
2.089  -0.457  -2.075  -2.219 
311  Food manufacturing  1.452  -1.186  4.013  2.222 
312  Beverage and tobacco 
product   
1.752  1.475  0.524  2.045 
313  Textile mills  1.494  -0.371  -1.433  -1.315 
314  Textile product mills  1.495  -1.019  -1.159  -1.887 
315  Apparel manufacturing  1.400  -0.387  0.652  2.183 
316  Leather and allied product    1.470  -5.368  -6.848  -7.685 
321  Wood product    1.507  0.995  -0.554  1.180 
322  Paper manufacturing  1.716  -5.466  -0.167  -4.900 
323  Printing and related activities  1.489  -0.708  -2.752  -3.204 
324  Petroleum and coal products    1.587  3.586  2.093  12.545 
325  Chemicals manufacturing  1.731  -0.620  1.273  2.877 
326  Plastics and rubber products    1.443  -2.233  -0.152  -2.108 
327  Nonmetallic mineral product    1.699  -1.212  -0.934  -1.167 
331  Primary metal manufacturing  1.414  -0.584  -4.338  -6.674 
332  Fabricated metal product    1.337  -0.616  1.664  0.741 
333  Machinery manufacturing  1.292  0.159  3.281  2.355 
334  Computer and electronic 
product   
1.439  -2.993  6.045  2.135 
335  Electrical equipment, 
appliances 
1.455  -0.682  -2.853  -2.993 
336  Transportation equipment    1.324  -1.656  6.362  4.125 
337  Furniture and related product    1.460  0.397  -2.052  -0.682 
339  Miscellaneous manufacturing  1.436  7.062  -0.959  5.878 
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Table 2.3. The Region-Specific Trade Costs During 1998-2009 
 
U.S. Regions 
Average  TC 
1998-2009 
Percentage change (%) 
1998-2001  2002-2009  1998-2009 
Mobile, AL  2.003  -9.666  15.596  -0.146 
Nogales, AZ  1.401  2.582  -7.916  -5.349 
Los Angeles, CA  1.463  -0.882  0.664  -0.760 
San Diego, CA  1.487  3.415  0.961  7.199 
San Francisco, CA  1.630  1.752  7.868  12.523 
Washington D.C.  1.748  13.300  1.440  11.115 
Miami, FL  1.739  -8.234  -0.579  -4.728 
Tampa, FL  1.803  -0.904  -0.701  -4.655 
Savannah, GA  1.682  2.384  -5.679  -4.263 
Chicago, IL  1.660  -1.362  -4.566  -4.346 
New Orleans, LA  1.730  -2.013  1.641  2.083 
Boston, MA  1.754  -3.518  -5.319  -6.805 
Baltimore, MD  1.705  7.666  27.836  31.431 
Portland, ME  1.430  -2.007  2.065  2.855 
Detroit, MI  1.087  -3.522  -2.275  -5.671 
Duluth, MN  1.525  -0.370  -5.330  -3.237 
Minneapolis, MN  2.088  4.007  -7.924  -1.112 
St. Louis, MO  2.263  4.076  6.104  8.448 
Great Falls, MT  1.418  -5.261  2.538  2.878 
Wilmington, NC  2.352  -0.861  -3.755  3.490 
Pembina, ND  1.355  6.629  17.284  19.873 
Buffalo, NY  1.232  -7.135  3.124  0.713 
New York City, NY  1.569  3.958  6.235  6.979 
Ogdensburg, NY  1.348  -1.091  -1.251  -1.672 
Cleveland, OH  1.752  -2.187  -0.349  -0.957 
Columbia-Snake, OR  1.708  -2.028  5.605  1.619 
Philadelphia, PA  1.880  -9.095  -2.276  -9.859 
Providence, RI  1.808  -9.566  -33.531  -31.543 
Charleston, SC  1.678  -3.690  -8.832  -10.339 
Dallas/Fort Worth, TX  1.682  -7.475  -2.901  -10.483 
El Paso, TX  1.255  -0.495  3.982  3.550 
Houston, TX  1.775  -4.044  -6.322  -8.576 
Laredo, TX  1.116  -0.857  3.334  3.386 
Port Arthur, TX  1.896  18.001  -10.432  -8.485 
Norfolk, VA  1.726  3.412  -5.823  -3.016     30 
 
 
St. Albans, VT  1.276  -4.057  -5.456  -4.637 
Seattle, WA  1.409  -0.192  11.818  9.101 
Milwaukee, WI  2.378  -3.307  -6.746  -10.517 
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Table 2.4. The Country-Specific Trade Costs During 1998-2009 
 
Country 
Average TC 
1998-2009 
Percentage change (%) 
1998-2001  2002-2009  1998-2009 
Argentina  1.921  2.122  -2.425  0.457 
Armenia  1.978  *  6.616  * 
Australia  1.702  -2.458  4.391  -2.510 
Austria  1.839  -2.739  1.661  2.551 
Azerbaijan  1.956  -12.448  7.562  1.135 
Belgium  1.748  -0.038  0.837  1.782 
Bolivia  1.881  3.218  -7.629  -3.709 
Brazil  1.687  -3.984  -3.113  -4.967 
Bulgaria  2.112  -4.617  6.215  3.152 
Canada  1.168  -2.693  2.863  0.369 
Chile  1.911  -0.544  -3.240  -2.822 
China  1.466  -2.806  0.414  -1.783 
Colombia  1.861  -7.458  -5.654  -10.259 
Cyprus  2.381  11.763  5.946  15.770 
Czech Republic  2.010  -0.061  2.875  2.202 
Denmark  1.817  -2.197  -4.301  -4.260 
Ecuador  2.175  -6.860  8.043  1.204 
Egypt  1.949  -1.896  4.354  -6.565 
Estonia  1.947  -9.506  13.153  8.159 
Germany  1.603  1.037  1.292  0.368 
Fiji  1.860  *  13.428  * 
Finland  2.027  -4.637  7.977  -1.006 
France  1.695  -2.416  3.715  -0.150 
Georgia  1.998  12.464  1.953  6.616 
Ghana  2.140  19.667  1.867  27.025 
Greece  1.968  7.615  -10.489  -8.007 
Hungary  1.980  -2.855  3.469  1.173 
India  1.808  9.394  -5.315  2.077 
Indonesia  1.795  -0.188  2.459  3.865 
Ireland  1.662  -3.696  7.031  4.295 
Israel  1.658  19.391  4.283  19.266 
Italy  1.745  -0.416  2.422  1.426 
Japan  1.532  -0.686  6.401  6.760 
Jordan  1.761  -11.982  -0.958  -19.833 
Kazakhstan  2.085  -18.225  -4.019  -29.101     32 
 
 
Korea, South  1.580  -0.090  9.313  7.504 
Kyrgyzstan  2.409  *  11.160  * 
Latvia  1.948  1.230  21.201  12.017 
Lithuania  2.152  7.990  24.579  18.218 
Macedonia (Skopje)  1.899  7.025  5.416  18.487 
Malawi  2.083  11.904  8.254  13.603 
Malaysia  1.498  -1.041  11.883  11.688 
Malta  1.973  0.291  -0.425  24.532 
Mexico  1.215  -1.155  0.377  -0.169 
Moldova  1.925  1.584  8.467  30.921 
Morocco  2.137  -4.254  -3.929  0.075 
Netherlands  1.732  -0.646  -1.115  -2.929 
Nigeria  1.880  9.460  -6.936  24.331 
Norway  1.948  -2.072  -0.230  -1.935 
Oman  1.828  1.109  21.164  25.078 
Panama  1.720  -10.011  -19.481  -21.759 
Peru  1.913  1.485  -5.654  0.846 
Poland  2.026  3.552  -0.501  1.461 
Portugal  1.979  -3.354  1.468  -0.367 
Qatar  2.141  2.797  -4.507  2.775 
Romania  2.036  -0.679  3.653  3.452 
Russia  1.919  4.905  0.595  1.964 
Senegal  2.491  8.607  6.633  21.091 
Singapore  1.572  -0.532  8.205  10.265 
Slovakia  2.110  1.214  -1.700  -1.654 
Slovenia  2.216  -1.648  2.725  5.817 
South Africa  1.935  -0.192  -2.108  -7.020 
Spain  1.975  -4.293  1.229  -2.047 
Sri Lanka  1.673  -2.170  0.643  -0.399 
Sweden  1.746  -3.552  6.178  0.493 
Thailand  1.668  0.989  2.970  5.069 
Trinidad and Tobago  1.801  0.636  -1.601  0.590 
Turkey  1.971  -5.116  11.985  5.260 
Ukraine  2.098  11.135  2.733  4.819 
United Kingdom  1.625  -2.263  2.697  1.587 
Uruguay  1.970  -4.763  2.516  -0.531 
Vietnam  1.849  4.100  -13.389  -19.740 
 
       33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
3. SOURCES OF TRADE COSTS BY U.S. REGIONS 
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The results on trade costs for 1998-2009, from Chapter 2, show substantial variation 
across industries, customs districts, trade partners, and time.    In the following, the 
underlying sources of trade costs are examined by regressing bilateral trade costs on 
policy, geographic, and institutional factors.   
 
3.1 Regression Model and Data for Trade Costs’ Sources 
In the following, bilateral trade costs are attributed to three major sources.    The first 
source relates to geographic factors like distance between trading partners and 
contiguity, i.e. sharing a common border.    Trade policy of the United States and its 
partners, e.g. tariffs, is an important component of trade costs.    Finally, institutional 
factors such as common language and logistics performance (e.g. exporter’s/ 
importer’s average time for all procedures) also influence trade costs.    Thus, a 
regression model is specified relating the dependent variable of trade costs to the 
following independent variables: Distance, Tariff rate of U.S., Tariff rate of U.S. 
trading partners, Common Border, Common Language, Landlocked, Logistics 
Performance.    However, the industry-specific tariff rate of United States and foreign 
countries is only available for 2004.    Hence, two specifications of the dependent 
variable are employed in the following analysis: 2005 trade costs and the weighted 
average of trade costs during 2005-2009.      
Following Novy (2006) and Coughlin and Novy (2009) trade costs are specified     35 
 
 
as: 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7
(3.1)  * * _ * _ *
                    * * *
ijs ij is js ij
ij j j ijs
TC Distance Tariff US Tariff cty Border
CommonLanguage LandLocked Logistics Error
    
  
    
   
where i denotes U.S. customs districts, j denotes U.S. trade partners, and s denotes 
each three-digit NAICS level industry.    A dummy variable for each customs district, 
trade partner and industry (DistrictDummy, CtyDummy, IndDummy) are added to the 
regression model in equation (3.1).
 
With regard to independent variables, distance between each major U.S. district 
and its trade partners (countries) is obtained by calculating the arc distance between 
their respective capitals or port cities.    Great circle distance between a U.S. district 
and the trade partner’s capital city is available in the public domain: 
http://www.indo.com/distance/.  Data on tariff rates of United States and foreign 
countries are obtained from the MAcMAPHS6 database
6.    This comprehensive 
database provides detailed tariff information at the six-digit level of the Harmonized 
System (HS6) for 169 importing countries for 2004.    Each record of MAcMAPHS6 
database contains bilateral ad valorem equivalent information of the reporter as the 
importing country and the partner as the exporting country.    The variable Tariff_ctyjs 
in equation (3.1) is taken from the records of MAcMAPHS6 database whose reporter 
is country j and partner is the United States.    Note that the various U.S. regions adopt 
the uniform U.S. (national) tariff rate for each HS six-digit product.    The variable 
Tariff_ USs in equation (3.1) is constructed via records whose reporter is the United     36 
 
 
States and partner is country j (one of 72 countries in Table 2.4).    Furthermore, 
employing the trade volume between the United States and its trade partners as 
weights, the weighted average U.S. tariff rate of each three-digit level of NAICS 
industry, Tariff_ USs, is derived.  Similarly, a weighted average of HS six-digit 
products’ tariff rate of U.S. trade partners is used to obtain Tariff_ctyjs in equation 
(3.1). 
The dummy variables, common language, common border and landlocked are 
taken from Rose (2000), but updated to 2009.
7  If trading pairs share a common 
language, the CommonLanguageij dummy in equation (3.1) takes value one, otherwise 
it takes value zero.    If the state where the U.S. customs district is located shares a 
border with a trade partner, the Borderij variable takes value one and zero otherwise.   
For example, the Dallas (Texas) customs district shares a common border with Mexico, 
and so, the associated Borderij variable takes value one.  The Landlockedj dummy 
variable only depends on the trade partner j, since the United States is not landlocked 
status.    If the trade partner j is landlocked, the Landlockedj dummy takes value one; 
otherwise it takes value zero.      
Measures of country-specific logistics performance are taken from the Trading 
Across Borders, Doing Business database compiled by the World Bank, which reports 
on 183 economies since 2006.    The World Bank database provides many options to 
represent logistics performance: exporter’s average time for all procedures, importer’s     37 
 
 
average time for all procedures, number of documents for export, and number of 
documents for import.    However, these logistics performance indicators are highly 
correlated with each other.    In order to minimize multicollinearity problems in the 
regression model, only one logistics performance indicator is included in equation 
(3.1): time required to import goods measured in calendar days,  j Logistics .
8  The 
time required to import goods includes time required to obtain all documents, inland 
transport and handling, customs clearance and inspections, and port and terminal 
handling.    Note however that the time required to import goods does not include 
ocean transport time.    In the 2005 (2005-2009 average) trade-costs regression, the 
2006 (2006-2009 average) time required to import goods is used as an explanatory 
variable.
9    Summary statistics on variables used to estimate equation (3.1) are shown 
in the second panel of table 2.1.   
 
3.2 Estimation Results 
Recall that two regression models are employed to investigate the determinants of 
bilateral trade costs: 2005 and 2005-2009 weighted average trade costs.    Within each 
empirical model, three alternative specifications are considered.    The first one is the 
base specification, which includes all observations.    The second specification 
contains observations for which the tariff rate of foreign countries is less than 20 
percent.    The weighted average tariff rate of 72 U.S. trade partners (when trading     38 
 
 
with the United States) is 7.41 percent with a standard deviation of 5.78 percent.    The 
threshold of 20 percent therefore equals two standard deviations above the mean.   
The majority of U.S. trade occurs with countries imposing a tariff rate of less than 20 
percent.    Hence, countries with closed economies (tariff rate of more than 20 percent) 
trade less with the United States.    Sensitivity of the regression estimates to alternative 
tariff thresholds is discussed in the following.  To the second specification, the 
logistics performance indicator, i.e. importer’s average time for all procedures, is 
added for the third specification. 
Table 3.1 shows the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimates of the 
model using 2005 trade costs as the dependent variable.    The base specification 
includes all observations.    The coefficient associated with the distance variable is 
significant and positive, which means that larger distance between the United States 
and its trade partners raises trade costs.    Table 3.1 also shows that both the 2004 U.S. 
tariff rate and that of the trade partners are not significantly associated with trade costs.   
Thus the policy factor, i.e. tariff rate, appears to be less influential in determining the 
variation of trade costs, a result on which additional insights are provided later in this 
section.     
Other geographical factors, such as common border and land-locked status, 
significantly affect U.S. trade costs at the one percent level.    The coefficient on the 
common border dummy has the expected negative sign and statistical significance at     39 
 
 
the one percent level.    Furthermore, high trade costs are observed when the U.S. 
trade partner is landlocked.    However, the institutional factor, common language, 
does not have the expected negative sign in the base specification. 
In specification two of table 3.1, the sample set only includes observations when 
U.S. trade partners’ tariff rate is less than 20 percent.    The size and significance of all 
GMM estimates do not vary much except for the coefficient associated with trade 
partners’ tariff rate, which is now positive and statistically significant at the one 
percent level.    Unlike in the base specification, the tariff rate of U.S. trade partners is 
now an underlying source of bilateral trade costs.    Note that the base specification 
contains all foreign countries including some developing countries which do not trade 
much with the United States, e.g. Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Malawi.    The inclusion 
of observations from high tariff and landlocked countries appears to have made it 
difficult to identify the tariff effects in the base specification.    Nevertheless, when 
excluding tariffs nearly two standard deviations above the sample average (of tariffs 
faced by the United States) in the second specification, the trade policy effect turns out 
to be one of the significant determinants of U.S. trade costs.    Therefore, deleting 
about a thousand observations on seemingly high tariffs helps in sharpening the focus 
on the significant impact of tariffs in trade costs.    Lowering the cutoff for trade 
partners’ tariff rate up to 15 percent does not alter the results of specification two 
reported in table 3.1.    Significant loss in the sample size arises when the cutoff is     40 
 
 
lowered below 15 percent.    Note, however, the coefficient on U.S. tariff rate is still 
not significant in specification two, which implies that its protection is not a 
determinant of trade costs between U.S. customs districts and its trade partners.    The 
underlying reason is the average U.S. tariff rate (2.33 percent) is significantly lower 
relative to the sample average of 7.41 percent.    In addition, zero tariff rates apply for 
a majority of U.S. agricultural and manufacturing industries with most partners.    In 
specification two, having a common border is still a big advantage that spurs U.S. 
trade flows with neighboring countries, such as Canada and Mexico.    The coefficient 
on the landlocked-dummy variable continues to have the expected sign and statistical 
significance, unlike that of the common language dummy. 
Specification three in table 3.1 includes the logistics performance indicator, i.e. 
importer’s average time for all procedures.    Here, distance is still a key determinant 
of trade costs between the United States and its trade partners.  While the U.S. tariff 
rate does not significantly affect trade costs, the coefficient on trade partners’ tariff 
rate remains positive and significant at the one percent level.    The coefficients on 
dummy variables Commonborder, Landlocked have the expected sign with statistical 
significance.    As expected, the importer’s average time for all procedures has a 
positive and significant relationship with bilateral trade costs.    That is, a country with 
a longer time required to complete procedures related to imports faces higher trade 
costs with the United States (Hausman et al., 2005).       41 
 
 
In the second regression model, the dependent variable is the weighted average 
trade costs during 2005-2009.    Table 3.2 presents the regression results of the three 
specifications estimated by the GMM procedure.    As before, the base specification 
contains all observations, observations for specification two is selected by the 
threshold (from above) of 20 percent of U.S. trade partners’ tariff rate.    The logistics 
performance is added to specification three extending specification two.   
In the base specification, the coefficient associated with the distance variable 
remains positive, slightly smaller than that in table 3.1, with statistical significance at 
the one percent level.    Other geographic factors, common border and landlocked 
status have the expected signs and significantly to trade costs between the United 
States and its trade partners.    As before, both the tariff rate of the United States and 
U.S. trade partners do not significantly impact trade costs in the base specification.  
In specification two, the tariff rate of U.S. trade partners turns positive and significant 
at the one percent level, while distance, common border and landlocked variables have 
the same sign, magnitude and significance as in the base specification.    Note that the 
coefficient on trade partners’ tariff is larger in the 2005-2009 regression relative to that 
in the 2005 regression.    In specification three, the coefficients on the determinants of 
trade costs and their statistical significance are strikingly similar to those in 
specification two (table 3.2).    In addition, the coefficient on logistics performance 
has the expected sign, but slightly smaller than that in table 3.1.    While estimates of     42 
 
 
distance and related effects have the expected sign and significance in specification 
three of table 3.3, the coefficient on Commonlanguage has now turned negative (as 
expected) and significant.    With a larger set of observations (table 3.1 versus table 
3.2) and a higher likelihood value, specification three in table 3.2 is the preferred 
model of this study.    In the following discussion of relative contribution of alternative 
determinants of trade costs, emphasis is placed on elasticities from the preferred 
model. 
Trade costs’ elasticities with respect to policy, geographic and institutional factors, 
derived from estimates of table 3.2, are presented in table 3.3.    Elasticities based on 
the estimates in table 3.1 are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported 
in table 3.3, except for the common language dummy.    The elasticities of the 
preferred model (specification three, table 3.2) suggest that a one percent increase in 
distance will increase the bilateral trade costs (United States and its trade partner) by 
0.65 percent, all else constant.  Similarly, when U.S. trade partners’ tariff rate 
increases by one percent, average trade costs with that country increase by 0.03 
percent.    Finally, every one percent increase in the importer’s average time for all 
procedures will raise bilateral trade costs by 0.56 percent.    The trade-costs elasticity 
with respect to tariffs is consistent with the conclusion in Novy (2006, 2009) that the 
policy-related trade friction plays a relatively small role in the determining trade costs.   
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) also find that the policy factor, including tariffs     43 
 
 
and regional trade agreements, can only explain eight percentage points of trade costs 
compared to forty-four points associated with common border effects.    The above 
elasticities imply that investments in infrastructure in the form of either roads or (air or 
sea) ports are likely to be more effective in reducing trade costs between the United 
States and its trade partners.    The United States may have a better road network and 
port infrastructure relative to its trade partners, but this study cannot identify whether 
investments in U.S. infrastructure or that of its trade partners will bring about a higher 
reduction in trade costs.
10  Nevertheless, relative to tariffs, improving physical and 
procedural infrastructure is important to lowering trade costs and improving 
conditions conducive for competition (Henderson et al. 2001; Limã o and Venables 
2001). 
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Table 3.1. The Determinants of Trade Costs in 2005 
 
Regressor 
GMM Results 
Specification One 
(base) 
Specification 
Two 
Specification 
Three 
Distance 
0.000214
*** 
(0.0000088)
 
0.000209
*** 
(0.0000093) 
0.000212
*** 
(0.0000093) 
Tariff rate of U.S. 
-0.263 
(0.246) 
-0.239 
(0.361) 
-0.214 
(0.368) 
Tariff rate of foreign countries 
0.039 
(0.032) 
0.559
*** 
(0.198) 
0.560
*** 
(0.200) 
Common Border 
-1.163
*** 
(0.067) 
-1.130
*** 
(0.067) 
-1.130
*** 
(0.068) 
Common Language 
0.456
*** 
(0.061) 
0.447
*** 
(0.080) 
1.450
*** 
(0.125) 
Land Locked 
0.970
*** 
(0.057) 
0.969
*** 
(0.079) 
0.862
*** 
(0.072) 
Importer’s average time for all 
procedures 
    0.059
*** 
(0.006) 
     
 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
U.S. region fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  18935  17974  17798 
Adjusted R
2  0.587  0.589  0.588 
Notes: The regression results of trade costs determinants in 2005 for three specifications are shown in the 
table 3.1.    Specification 1 represents the base model including all the sample data. Specification 2 and 
specification 3 represent the models with the observations with the tariff rate of other countries less than 
20%.    Standard deviations are in parentheses. Industry fixed effects are for three-digit NAICS industries.   
Coefficients for the intercept and dummy variables are suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
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Table 3.2. The Determinants of Weighted Average Trade Costs during 2005-2009 
 
Regressor 
GMM Results 
Specification 
One (base) 
Specification 
Two 
Specification 
Three 
Distance 
0.000194
*** 
(0.000010) 
0.000190
*** 
(0.000010) 
0.000191
*** 
(0.000009) 
Tariff rate of U.S. 
-0.209 
(0.215) 
-0.234 
(0.307) 
-0.175 
(0.315) 
Tariff rate of foreign countries 
0.017 
(0.024) 
0.955
*** 
(0.167) 
0.960
*** 
(0.167) 
Common Border 
-1.188
*** 
(0.090) 
-1.147
*** 
(0.087) 
-1.148
*** 
(0.067) 
Common Language 
0.654
*** 
(0.070) 
0.552
*** 
(0.100) 
-0.859
*** 
(0.104) 
Land Locked 
1.036
*** 
(0.058) 
1.070
*** 
(0.070) 
0.961
*** 
(0.058) 
Importer’s average time for all 
procedures 
   
0.056
*** 
(0.004) 
         
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
U.S. region fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  24801  23301  23050 
Adjusted R
2  0.615  0.617  0.618 
Notes: The regression results of trade costs decomposition in 2005-2009 for three specifications are shown in 
the table 3.2. Specification 1 represents the base model including all the sample data. Specification 2 and 
specification 3 represent the observations with the tariff rate of foreign countries less than 20%. Industry 
fixed effects are for three-digit NAICS industries. Coefficients for the intercept and dummy variables are 
suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
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Table 3.3. Trade Costs’ Elasticities with respect to Distance, Tariffs, and Logistics 
Indicator (2005-2009 Average) 
 
Trade cost elasticity with respect to 
Specification One 
(base) 
Specification 
Two 
Specification 
Three 
Distance  0.665  0.646  0.649 
Tariff Rate of U.S. (2004)  -0.003  -0.003  -0.002 
Tariff Rate of Foreign Countries 
(2004) 
0.001  0.032  0.033 
Common Border  -0.014  -0.014  -0.015 
Common Language  0.073  0.062  -0.094 
Land Locked  0.050  0.054  0.049 
Importer’s average time for all 
procedures 
    0.560 
Note: The trade costs’ elasticities with respect to distance, tariffs, and logistics reflect the change of percent 
in weighted average trade costs over 2005-2009 with additional one percent change in each explanatory 
variable. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF 
TRADE COSTS ON FIRM ENTRY, EXIT, AND INTRA-INDUSTRY 
RESOURCE REALLOCATION 
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In this chapter, a conceptual framework for the effect of trade costs on firm entry, exit, 
and employment patterns is developed.
11  The approach draws on Melitz’s (2003) 
model of intra-industry competition, where trade openness yields aggregate 
productivity gains through:
12 
  exit of least productive firms (extensive margin), and   
  resource reallocation towards more efficient firms (intensive margin).     
The first objective here is to design an empirical model to test the extensive-margin 
hypothesis underlying the Melitz’s (2003) model that a decrease in variable trade costs 
raises the probability of firm (establishment) exit.
13  Then, the intensive-margin 
hypothesis is to be tested by examining changes in the employment of surviving firms 
and new entrants following changes in trade costs.    The following briefly outlines the 
Melitz (2003) framework, which provides the foundation for the proposed firm exit, 
entry and employment equations to be estimated. 
Unlike Krugman’s (1980) monopolistic competition model with homogeneous 
firms, Melitz’s (2003) approach shows that firms with different productivities coexist 
in an industry.    An industry characterized by heterogeneous firms arises because, 
before expending an irreversible cost to enter the industry, firms face uncertainty 
about their productivity realization.    After incurring the entry cost, they do observe 
their productivity and choose either to exit if variable profit does not cover fixed 
production cost; or serve only domestic markets if variable profit covers only fixed     49 
 
 
production cost; or serve domestic and foreign markets if variable profit covers fixed 
production and fixed foreign market entry costs. 
On account of fixed production cost, only firms with productivities yielding zero 
(break-even) or positive profit π remain in production, referred to as the zero cutoff 
profit (ZCP) condition.    Melitz (2003) refers to the break-even point as the cut-off 
productivity φ
*, which truncates the productivity distribution of industry, g(φ), from 
below.    On the other hand, a free entry (FE) condition ensures that long run average 
profit  𝜋 ̅ equals the fixed cost of entry incurred before productivity realization.   
Hence industry’s average productivity  𝜑 ̃, long run average profit, and the cut-off 
productivity at which a firm breaks even are endogenous in Melitz (2003) framework.   
The industry’s average productivity  𝜑 ̃  is then a function of the cut-off φ
*: 
  
*
1
1
*1
*
1
(4.1)                          ( ) ( ) ,
1 ( )
gd
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

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where  𝜎 > 1  denotes the elasticity of substitution, G(•) denote the cumulative 
productivity function. 
Under a closed economy, new entrants only have two choices: exit or serve the 
domestic market.    There is only one cutoff productivity level φ
* that determines the 
industry’s equilibrium.    Both zero cutoff profit (ZCP) condition and free entry (FE) 
condition depict the relationship between the average profit level  𝜋 ̅  and cutoff 
productivity level φ
*, the two determinants of the industry’s equilibrium.    Formally, 
the two conditions can be expressed as:     50 
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where f denotes the fixed costs of production, fe denotes the sunk cost required for 
entry,  𝗿  denotes a constant probability of a bad shock that forces firms to exit in each 
period.     
    The zero cutoff profit condition posits that the average profit is decreasing with 
the cutoff productivity level, while the opposite situation arises in the free entry 
condition.    Note that the cutoff productivity level φ
*
 has a continuous cumulative 
distribution G(•) which is increasing by φ
*, and hence, the average profit level  𝜋 ̅  has 
a positive relationship with the cutoff φ
* in the free entry condition.    However, k(•) is 
a decreasing function of the cutoff φ
* (with  𝜎 > 1) that determines a negative 
relationship between the cutoff φ
* and the average profit level  𝜋  ̅in the zero cutoff 
profit condition.    The equilibrium cutoff productivity level φ
* and equilibrium 
average profit level  𝜋 ̅ are determined by those two conditions as in figure 4.1. 
In an open economy, a firm has a third choice: produce for both the domestic and 
foreign market (export), in addition to the previous two choices: exit or serve the 
domestic market only.    The original cutoff productivity level φ
* is associated with 
firms having zero profit.    Only firms with productivities equal or greater than cutoff 
level φ
* can successfully survive and remain in production.    A new cutoff     51 
 
 
productivity level denoted as 𝜑𝑥
∗  incurs due the possibility of serving foreign markets.   
Thus, the more productive firms self-select to enter the export market with 
productivities equal or greater than the new cut-off level 𝜑𝑥
∗.    The free entry 
condition remains the same as in the closed economy.    Nevertheless, the zero cut-off 
profit condition is altered due to additional profits in the export markets.    The new 
zero cutoff profit condition is written as follows: 
** (4.4)                  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )      (ZCP), d x x x x x x p n f k p nf k               
where px denotes the ex-ante probability that firms survive in the export market, n 
denotes the number of countries that a firm export to, fx represents the fixed cost of 
production in the export market.   
Under the open economy, firms with relatively large productivity self-select into 
the export market and earn extra profit reflected in equation (4.4).    Thus the ZCF 
curve is shifted upward relative to its position in figure 4.1.    The new zero cutoff 
profit condition and free entry condition are shown in figure 4.2 with the new 
equilibrium cutoff productivity level  𝜑∗′ and average profit level  𝜋 ̅′.    As figure 4.2 
displays, the new equilibrium cutoff productivity level φ
* required to survive in the 
domestic market increases to higher level  𝜑∗′.  This change forces firms with 
productivity levels between φ
* and  𝜑∗′  to exit the domestic market.    Therefore, the 
probability of firm exit will increase and the average profit level will be larger under 
situation where an economy switches from autarky to open trade.         52 
 
 
Melitz (2003) identified three channels through which trade liberalization occurs: 
(i) an increase in the number of trade partners, (ii) a decrease in the fixed trade costs fx, 
and (iii) a decrease in the variable trade costs τ.    This study focuses on the third 
mechanism only.    The extra profit earned through export markets  𝜋𝑥  in equation 
(4.4) can be defined as follows: 
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where rx denotes firms’ additional revenue from exporting.    When variable trade 
costs τ decline,  𝜏1−𝜎  will increase as the elasticity of substitution is greater than one.   
Hence, the ZCP curve will shift further up as in figure 4.2.    The new equilibrium 
cutoff productivity level φ
* further increases again during the trade liberalization 
process.  All firms with productivity levels ranging from  𝜑∗′  to  𝜑∗′′are now forced 
to exit from the domestic market.    The trade-cost induced exit of low-productivity 
firms is referred to as the extensive margin.    The underlying hypothesis of extensive 
margin is that more exposure to trade increases the probability of domestic firm’s exit 
from its home market due to the higher equilibrium cutoff productivity level relative 
to a closed economy or an open economy without trade liberalization.     
On the other hand, the equilibrium average profit level also increases with the 
export participation of high-productivity.    Resources such as labor released from 
exiting firms are now reallocated to more productive firms with higher revenue and 
profit, i.e., there is adjustment along the intensive margin.    The net effect of trade     53 
 
 
liberalization on industry employment requires an accounting of how much 
employment is: (i) lost due to existing firms, (ii) gained from entering (new) firms, 
and (iii) gained or lost by surviving firms.    Among the surviving firms, some may 
expand and others may shrink.    Overall, the average profit level within an industry 
will increase due to declining variable trade costs.    Hence, the underlying hypothesis 
of the intensive margin is that there might be more employment opportunities through 
resource reallocation under trade liberalization process. 
Figure 4.3 and 4.4 show how market shares and profits of firms with different 
levels of productivity change under three scenarios.    When a closed economy opens 
its markets, all firms lose part of domestic sales resulting from intensified foreign 
competition.    Foreign corporations enter domestic market and seize domestic market 
shares in the competition with domestic firms.    Recall that the cutoff level has been 
bid up because of intensive competition and the least-productive firms exit now due to 
negative profits.    Firms with productivity just above the cut-off level, i.e. the 
low-productive firms, continue to serve only for the domestic market, but incur a 
profit loss due to lower market shares.    The high-productive firms self-select into the 
export market and gain more total revenues with increased foreign market shares.   
Among high-productive firms, some face a tradeoff between increased total revenue 
and additional costs of exporting including fixed costs of foreign market entry and 
variable costs of production.    Such firms might lose profits, as extra fixed export cost     54 
 
 
cannot be completely covered by increased total revenue.    Only the most productive 
firms gain more profits after entering the export markets. 
    In an open economy with declining variable trade costs τ, the cutoff productivity 
keeps increasing, which forces the next set of least-productive firms to exit – the 
extensive margin.    Nevertheless, lowered trade barriers reduce the cutoff productivity 
level for entering the export market, which encourage more high-productive firms to 
enter foreign markets.    The direction of the change in firms’ revenue and profit 
shown in figure 4.3 implies that production resources, e.g. employment, will be 
reallocated from less productive to more productive firms – intensive margin.    Both 
factors will improve national welfare, but some regions may lose because of firm exits 
and job losses. 
In addition to Melitz (2003), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) consider the 
relationship between market size and the equilibrium cutoff productivity level, firm 
performance measures (profit, revenue, mark-up) and distribution of firms in the 
process of trade liberalization.    Market size in terms of the number and average 
productivity of competing firms influences the “toughness” of competition across 
markets.    Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) incorporate endogenous differences in 
mark-ups across firms that respond to the “toughness” of competition into the 
monopolistically competitive model with heterogeneous firms.    The introduction of 
endogenous distribution of mark-ups will influence the selection of producers and     55 
 
 
exporters with heterogeneous productivities in that market.    They conclude that the 
selection process is tougher in the larger market leading to higher average productivity 
and lower average prices relative to smaller markets.    In addition, the average firm 
size in terms of output and sales and profits are both higher in the larger market. The 
increased competition in the larger market induces a downward shift in the distribution 
of mark-ups across firms.    Only relatively more productive firms with relatively 
higher mark-ups can survive and the less-productive firms have to exit.    As a result, 
the average mark-up is reduced during trade liberalization.    In this model, welfare 
gains from trade thus include productivity gains via selection, lower mark-ups via 
pro-competition effect, and increased product variety.    Syverson (2007) provides 
empirical evidence that larger markets induce larger average plant size along with 
higher average plant productivity.    He obtains further support for the tougher 
competition effect in larger markets: the distribution of productivity is less disperse 
with a higher lower bound for the productivity distribution.    This framework 
provided by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) develops a new and very tractable way of 
analyzing how differences in market size and trade costs across trading partners affect 
the firm dynamics (entry, exit, and survival) and resource reallocation (e.g. 
employment turnover) across markets.    Incorporating market size, this study will 
examine the impact of trade costs on regional exit and employment patterns in U.S. 
private industries in the spirit of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) in the next few chapters. 
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Figure 4.1. Average Profit Level  π ̅  and Cutoff Productivity Level Φ
* under the 
Equilibrium in the Closed Economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Average Profit Level  π ̅  and Cutoff Productivity Level Φ
* under the 
Equilibrium in the Open Economy and Trade Liberalization 
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Figure 4.3. Firms’ Revenue and Cutoff Productivity Level under Three Scenarios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Firms’ Profit and Cutoff Productivity Level under Three Scenarios 
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CHAPTER 5   
5. AVAILABLE DATA ON U.S. BUSINESS DYNAMICS: EXIT, ENTRY, AND 
EMPLOYMENT 
       59 
 
 
The primary sources of data for examining issues described in Chapter 4 are 
Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS) and Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB), both 
from U.S. Census Bureau, trade costs from Chapter 2, and finally the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, U.S. Department Commerce.    Much of these data are at the 
firm- or establishment-level, but static in the sense that firms are not tracked over 
time.    For the purposes of this study, these firm- or establishment-level data are 
aggregated to regional- or state-level to be consistent with the measures of trade 
costs.    Thus, data are two dimensional: state or region, s, and time t. The following 
describes in detail the available data and their definitions.     
 
5.1 Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS) 
To examine the extensive and intensive margin changes at the U.S. region level, the 
BDS database from U.S. Census Bureau is accessed.    The BDS database contains 
annual data series describing establishment-level business dynamics, entry, exit and 
job creation.  A unique BDS feature is its longitudinal source data that permit 
tracking establishments and firms by size and age groups over time.
14  That is, key 
economic data including number of establishments, establishment openings and 
closings, number of employment, job creation and destruction are recorded in BDS 
data along dimensions of firm size and firm age.    BDS series provides annual 
statistics from 1976 through 2009 by U.S. states.    This study focuses on BDS data     60 
 
 
during 1998-2009, which consists of over six million establishments in the entire U.S. 
private industry (all sectors: food, manufacturing, construction, mining and services) 
that are located in 56 regions or customs districts.   
    The annual statistics of BDS database accessed for examining extensive margin 
and intensive margin contain Firm_Size, Firm_Age, Firms, Estabs, Estabs_Exit, 
Estabs _ Entry, Emp, Job_Creation, Job_Destruction.     
  Firm_Size classifies firms by size, which is measured by the average 
employment over a consecutive two-year period (t-1 and t), 
  Firm_Age is defined by the difference between the initial operation year and 
the current year, 
  Firms measures the number of firms that have positive employment and 
consist of one or more domestic establishments that were specified under 
common ownership or control in the current year t, 
  Estabs measures the number of establishments that have positive employment 
and conduct business or perform services or industrial operations in the current 
year t, 
  Estabs_Entry measures the total number of establishments which report zero 
employment in the last year t-1 and positive employment in the current year t,   
  Estabs_Exit measures the total number of establishments with zero 
employment in the current year t and positive employment in the prior year t-1.       61 
 
 
Note that data on Estabs_Exit will be used to construct the response variable in 
the empirical model of extensive margin hypothesis,   
  Emp measures the total number of paid employment consisting of full and 
part-time employees, who are on the payroll in the pay period including March 
12,   
  Job_Creation measures the number of employment gains from expanding 
establishments from t-1 to t.    The new employment opportunities created by 
new entrants (Firm_Age=0) is also included in the Job_Creation, and   
  Job_Destruction measures the number of employment loss from contracting 
establishments from t-1 to t. 
 
5.2 Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB) 
The SUSB from the U.S. Census Bureau provides data comparable to BDS, but for 
each major U.S. three-digit NAICS industry.
15  Annual data include number of 
firms, number of establishments, employment, and annual payroll for most U.S. 
business establishments within each industry.    In addition, data include number of 
establishment deaths and births.    Both data are tabulated by geographic area, 
industry, and enterprise employment size.    Industry classification is based on 2007 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes.    Here:   
  Establishment is defined as a single physical location where business is     62 
 
 
conducted or where services or industrial operations are performed,   
  Employment accounts for the number of paid employment who are on the 
payroll in the pay period including March 12 every year.    It consists of full 
and part-time employees, 
  Annual Payroll is defined as total annual payroll including all forms of 
compensation paid during the year to all employees, and 
  Firm is defined as a business organization consisting of one or more 
domestic establishments in the same state and industry that were specified 
under common ownership or control.     
For single-establishments, the firm is equivalent to the establishment.    However, if 
the firms are multi-establishments, the employment and annual payroll of firms are 
for all establishments under common ownership.    Additionally,   
  Establishment Births corresponds to the number of the establishments that 
have zero employment in the first quarter of the initial year and positive 
employment in the first quarter of the subsequent year, and 
  Establishment Deaths corresponds to the number of the establishments that 
have positive employment in the first quarter of the initial year and zero 
employment in the first quarter of the subsequent year. 
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5. 3 Trade Costs and Other Regressors 
Recall from Chapter 2 that trade costs here refer to all factors limiting the movement 
of goods and services across countries, including handling and transportation costs, 
tariffs and other barriers.    Equation (2.21) in Chapter 2 is used to measure U.S. 
region-level relative bilateral trade costs, broadly defined to include policy, geographic, 
and institutional factors limiting trade.  We have computed two alternative trade costs 
series: one that is based on U.S. Exports of Merchandise and U.S. Imports of 
Merchandise from the Foreign Trade Statistics of U.S. Census Bureau, and another 
that is based on WISERTrade database, U.S. Census Bureau.
16  Both databases 
characterize the current value of commodities identified by the ten-digit Harmonized 
System (HS) Schedule B Classification from a U.S. customs district (i) to each final 
destination (j).    The Merchandise Imports and Exports databases report where cargo 
entered or exited the United States, which may not correspond to where the goods 
were produced or consumed (that is, state of origin of movement and state of ultimate 
destination are unknown).    In the WISERTrade database, the state of origin of 
movement and state of ultimate destination are recorded, but data availability is 
limited, i.e. 2008-2009. 
Several additional factors that may impact extensive and intensive margin are 
considered: 
  Startup is defined as the ratio of establishments with equal or less than three     64 
 
 
years’ operation to the total establishments within the U.S. private industry or 
each major U.S. three-digit NAICS industry per year,   
  Wage, the U.S. state real per capital personal income (in 2005 dollars) that 
comes from the table of Personal Income, Per Capita Personal Income, 
Disposable Personal Income and Population under Regional Data section 
from Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.    To 
examine business dynamics for each U.S. three-digit NAICS industry, the 
variable Wage is measured directly using the annual payroll divided by the 
number of employment.    Payroll is converted to 2005 dollars by deflating it 
with the annual price indexes for personal consumption and expenditure 
(Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce).   
  Multi-establishment Status is defined as the ratio of number of establishments 
to the number of firms within U.S. private industries or each major U.S. 
three-digit NAICS industry per year, and   
  Market Size in this study employs annual population estimate on July 1 for 
each U.S. state extracted from U.S. Census Bureau.       65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
6. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
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6.1 Empirical Framework for Extensive Margin 
In order to examine the extensive margin changes arising from variable trade costs’ 
changes, a logistic regression model is specified for the probability of exit.    Based 
on the trade-cost measure from the previous chapter, and using insights from 
Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006), the following logistic regression model is 
proposed for estimation: 
,
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where s denotes each U.S. state, and t indexes time.    In this regression model, the 
dependent variable  ,
d
st P   is the probability of death for establishments located in the 
U.S. state s during year t-1 and t.    The term  ,1 st     represents variable trade costs in 
the U.S. state s at year t-1.    Recall two measures of trade costs, which are referred 
to using their respective samples: 1998-2009 and 2008-2009.   
The term Xs,t-1 represents a list of explanatory variables including size, age, 
wage, and ownership, which are characteristics of a representative establishment of 
U.S. industries (either private industries or major three-digit NAICS industries).   
All of those characteristics have been found to potentially affect establishment 
survival in numerous studies (Dunne et al., 1989; Bernard et al., 2006, etc.).   
Specific variables included in Xs,t-1 are:   
  Total employment to represent the size of the establishment.    The sign 
associated with variable log(emps,t-1) is expected to be negative, which     67 
 
 
implies that an establishment with a larger size tends to have a lower 
probability of exit.         
  Startups,t-1 represents the proportion of startup establishments having three 
years or less length of operation.    The expected sign associated with 
variable Startups,t-1 should be positive, as younger establishments are more 
likely to exit than are firms that have a long track record (Bernard et al., 
2006).     
In addition, controls for the wage level and multi-establishment status are 
included as recent studies find that these attributes also influence the dynamics of 
establishments (Bernard and Jensen, 2007).    The real per capita income in the log 
form, denoted as log(wages,t-1), is included to control for the wage level differences 
across states.    High wages are likely to proxy for high labor productivity.    Recall 
that establishments with productivity larger than the cut off level in a market tend to 
survive (Melitz, 2003).    Thus, the sign associated with log(wages,t-1) is expected to 
be negative.    Furthermore, Bernard et al. (2006) add control for multi-establishment 
status to examine the reallocative effects of changing trade costs on establishment 
survival.    In order to measure the multi-establishment status of a representative 
establishment in some industry, the ratio of total number of establishments to total 
number of firms is employed.    The expected sign associated with 
multi-establishment status is negative since firms that have multiple units of     68 
 
 
establishments or plants are usually more productive due to large amount of skilled 
labor and efficient capital (Bernard and Jensen, 2007).    Local market size, 
measured by population, is included to control for the influence of competition.   
The coefficient on log(pop) is expected to be negative, since establishments in large 
markets are more productive and tend to have a higher chance of survival.  Finally, 
s    and  t    denote sets of state and time dummies.
17   
    In order to fully explore the establishment dynamics in response to changing 
variable trade costs, an establishment birth equation is specified:   
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where the dependent variable in the establishment birth equation is the ratio of the 
number of births to the total number of surviving establishments.    The term  ,1 st    
is the measure of variable trade costs of state s at time t-1 and Xs,t-1 is a set of control 
variables: size, age, wage level and multi-establishment status.    The size of the 
local market measured by population in log form is also included in the 
establishment birth equations.    As in the establishment death equation, year and 
state fixed effects are employed.     
 
6.2 Empirical Framework for Intensive Margin 
This section focuses on investigating the association between trade costs’ changes 
and resource reallocation, specifically, employment.    Particularly, three     69 
 
 
trade-induced effects on employment are explored: (i) the effects of changing trade 
costs on jobs in contracting establishments, (ii) the effects of changing trade costs on 
jobs in expanding establishments, and (iii) the effects of changing trade costs on net 
job creation in all continuing establishments.    Again, all the investigations focus on 
the entire U.S. private industry during 1998-2009.   
For the response of jobs in contracting establishments to changing trade costs, 
an establishment employment equation is specified as follows: 
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where s denotes each U.S. state, and t indexes time.    In this regression model, the 
dependent variable  ,
c
st  is the ratio of job losses (destruction) in contracting 
establishments to total employment of state s at year t.    The term  ,1 st     represents 
variable trade costs in the U.S. state s at year t.    The underlying hypothesis is that as 
trade costs fall, job losses or destruction in contracting establishments will increase 
because of loss of both market sales and profits, i.e., there is a negative coefficient 
on trade costs.     
As before, Xs,t-1 represents a list of control variables: size, age, wage, ownership, 
and market size.    All of these factors likely influence the change in the employment 
situation of establishments under intensified intra-industry competition due to trade 
liberalization.    The establishment size is represented by the number of employees in 
the log form.    A positive association between job destruction and establishment size     70 
 
 
is expected since large firms are likely to have more flexibility in rearranging labor 
resources.    Startup, the ratio of establishments with equal to or less than three years’ 
operation in total, may also be positively related to job destruction.    Younger 
establishments are more likely to diminish their scale and employment when facing 
intense competition in a market.    In addition, controls for the wage level and 
multi-establishment status are included in the intensive margin equation.    Since 
wages proxy for productivity, a negative coefficient is expected for the log (wage) in 
equation (6.3).  With respect to the multi-establishment status, the establishment 
that belongs to a multi-unit firm is quite flexible to adjust its scale based on the 
competitive environment and its market sales and profit level.    Hence, a positive 
relationship is anticipated between multi-establishment status and job destruction.     
Again, local market size, log(pop), and t  , the set of time dummies, are included. 
A similar specification as in equation (6.4) is employed to examine the effects 
of changing trade costs on the job creation in expanding establishments.    The 
regression model is as follows: 
exp exp exp exp
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where s denotes each U.S. state, and t indexes time.    In this regression model, the 
dependent variable  , st  is the ratio of job creation by expanding establishments to 
total employment for state s at year t.    The term  ,1 st     represents variable trade 
costs in the U.S. state s at year t, Xs,t-1 represents explanatory variables: size, age,     71 
 
 
wage, ownership, and market size, and t    denotes the set of time dummies. 
With more exposure to competition under trade liberalization, only most 
efficient establishments thrive and grow – they export and increase both their market 
share profits.    The jobs released by less efficient establishments are likely 
reallocated toward the expanding establishments.    As trade costs fall, such 
expanding establishments are more likely to create more job openings.    Thus, we 
anticipate a negative association between job creation by expanding establishments 
and trade costs.    With respect to establishment and market characteristic, note that 
larger, younger and more efficient establishments have high potential to create 
employment.  More specifically, the younger establishments are on the expansion 
track, which would add jobs to a market.    In addition, establishments that can afford 
high wages are usually more efficient.    As variable trade costs fall resulting from 
more exposure to trade and foreign market sales and profits rise, the most efficient 
establishments attract abundant employment reallocated from less efficient ones.   
The establishments that belong to multi-unit firms are more likely to create more 
jobs due to their flexibility.    Market size, measured by population, is expected to be 
positively related to job creation by expanding establishments in a market.   
Finally, whether or not changing trade costs will affect net job creation by 
continuing establishments is examined using the following model: 
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where s denotes each U.S. state, and t indexes time.    In this regression model, the 
dependent variable , st  is the ratio of net job creation by continuing establishments 
to total employment of state s at year t.    The term  ,1 st     represents variable trade 
costs in the U.S. state s at year t.    The association between net job creation and 
trade costs measure is likely an empirical issue.    On one hand, when trade costs fall, 
the more efficient establishments gain both market shares and profits, and then offer 
more employment.    On the other hand, in order to survive in the market, the less 
efficient establishments are likely to diminish their scale and employment to reduce 
costs.    Thus, the net of these two effects, arising from more exposure to trade, 
depends on their relative strength.    As before, the net job creation equations 
includes controls and time fixed effects. 
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CHAPTER 7 
7. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
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7.1 Establishment Exit Equations for the U.S. Private Industry 
Recall that the logistic regression model of equation (6.1) is employed to investigate 
the potential competitive effects of changing variable trade costs.    The results of 
estimating establishment death equations for 1998-2009 are described in this chapter 
focusing initially on the extensive margin hypothesis.    Results are reported across 
nine columns in table 7.1, with the first two specifications focusing on the trade costs 
measure and subsequent columns including various sets of additional establishment 
and market characteristics.    Except for the second column, results are reported with 
year and state fixed effects.    The 1998-2009 trade costs covers 28 U.S. states that 
have customs districts and hence, the total number of observations in this regression 
model is 308.    In order to alleviate concerns of endogeneity issues, we use one-year 
lagged explanatory variables on the right hand side of the logistic regression models. 
The second column of Table 7.1 focuses only on the variable trade costs of 
interest without year and state fixed effects.    It indicates that establishment death 
and variable trade costs have the expected negative association: as trade costs fall, 
establishment death is more likely.    The coefficient on trade costs is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.    When adding sets of state and year dummies into the 
regression model, the trade cost measure is still negative and statistically significant 
at the 1% level, as shown in the second column of table 7.1.    Columns four to ten 
report regressions that add in establishment characteristics as well as market size.       75 
 
 
In all nine specifications, trade costs coefficient remains negative and statistically 
significant between the 1% and 5% level.    Note that the magnitude of the trade 
costs coefficient, or level of significance does not vary much with additional 
controls.   
On the basis of likelihood ratio tests
18, the ninth specification is the preferred 
model, i.e. the last column of table 7.1.    In this logistic regression model, the 
dependent variable is the odds of establishment death in the log form.    The 
coefficient associated with variable trade costs implies that the chances of 
establishment death will increase as trade costs decline, which is consistent with the 
underlying hypothesis of heterogeneous firms theory (Melitz, 2003; Bernard et al., 
2003; Bernard et al., 2006).    Lower trade costs intensify competition within the 
domestic market, and force low-productivity establishments to lose market share and 
exit the market.    Recall that the trade costs measure is relative, i.e., a ratio of 
international trade to domestic trade costs.    Hence, the interpretation here is that 
when international trade costs relative to domestic trade costs decrease by one 
hundred percent (one unit, absolute value), the estimated odds of establishment death 
will raise by 8.33% holding all else constant. 
The variable Startup (proportion of startups in total establishments) is also 
statistically significant and positive as expected.    The odds of establishment death 
will increase by 1.27% with additional one percent increase in the proportion of     76 
 
 
startup establishments.    This result suggests that older establishments are more 
likely to survive.    As implied by theory, the variable log(wage) has a negative 
association with establishment death with 1% level of significance.    The wage level 
is one indicator of an establishment’s productivity.    The establishment that can 
afford a higher wage level likely has a relatively higher marginal value of product.   
As mentioned in the Melitz’s model (2003), the least productive establishments are 
always forced to exit from the market with more exposure to free trade.    The less 
productive establishments can survive at least, but lose domestic market shares.   
Thus the establishments with lowest productivity are most likely to fail and exit the 
market.    A ten percent increase in the wage level is associated with a 8.52% 
reduction in the odds of establishment death.    The coefficient associated with 
multi-establishment status is negative and significant at the 1% level.    As the ratio 
of establishments to firms increases by one percent, the estimated mean odds of 
establishment death will decrease by 1.16%.    The latter is consistent with the claim 
that multi-unit firms are more likely to be productive and help their subsidiaries 
avoid closure risk.    Market size is also a relevant factor that impacts the death 
probability at the 10% significance level.    The establishments located in large 
markets are more likely survive due to agglomeration economies.    Burger et al. 
(2010) find that agglomeration economies have a positive effect on new 
establishments’ survival, especially the larger ones.           77 
 
 
The association between establishment deaths and changing trade costs using 
2008-2009 trade costs’ measures is examined as a robustness check.    Due to the 
availability of trade data on the import side, trade costs’ measures are available for 
48 contiguous U.S. states and one customs district for 2008-2009.    Hence, in this 
specification of the establishment death equation, there are 49 observations in total.   
Regression results are displayed across eight columns in table 7.2 with the first 
specification focusing on the trade cost measure of interest and subsequent columns 
including establishment characteristics and market size.    Given the cross-sectional 
data structure, year or state dummy variables are not included.    Across all variants, 
trade costs negatively affect establishment death, which is consistent with the results 
of establishment death equation using the alternative trade cost measure.    The 
magnitude of the trade cost coefficient is slightly greater than that of the alternative 
trade cost measure.    On the basis of a likelihood ratio test, the fifth variant is the 
preferred model.    In this specification, the trade cost coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level.    With a 100% additional increase in 
international trade costs relative to domestic trade costs, the associated odds of 
establishment death decrease by 15.63%.    As implied by theory, wage level, as an 
index of relative productivity, is also negatively associated with establishment death, 
a statistically significant result.    With respect to other establishment characteristics, 
it appears that larger, older establishments are more likely to survive.    Furthermore,     78 
 
 
for establishments that are part of a large, multi-unit firm, the probability of death 
conditional on other establishment characteristic is lower.     
 
7.2 Establishment Exit Equation by Major U.S. Three-Digit NAICS Industries 
Recall that the extensive margin hypothesis is that a decrease in variable trade costs 
raises the probability of firm (establishment) exit.    This is now tested for each 
major U.S. three-digit NAICS industry using the SUSB database.
19  The SUSB 
contains information on the number of establishments, number of deaths and births, 
firms, employment and annual payroll for most U.S. business establishments by each 
three-digit NAICS industry.    Nine specifications as in Table 7.1 are employed to 
examine establishment death in each U.S. three-digit NAICS industry.    The focus is 
on 24 out of 33 three-digit NAICS industries during the period 1999-2006 due to 
data constraints.    Among the 24 industries, two relate to forestry products, fish and 
other marine products from agricultural industries, while the other 22 are from 
manufacturing industries (one is an information industry).    The coefficients 
associated with the trade cost measure in different specifications are reported across 
nine columns in table 7.3 with each row representing a three-digit NAICS industry.   
The first two columns in table 7.3 focus on the trade cost measure and subsequent 
columns include various sets of additional establishment and market characteristics.   
All the coefficients associated with other regressors have been suppressed due to     79 
 
 
space limitations.    Except for the first column, results are reported with year and 
state fixed effects.    In order to eliminate the endogeneity problem, one-year lagged 
explanatory variables are used on the right hand side of the logistic regression 
models. 
In table 7.3, the coefficient and its standard error in bold font denote the 
associated specification as the preferred model among all various specifications.   
Again, the preferred model is selected on the basis of likelihood ratio test.    As 
shown in table 7.3, in the two sub-sectors (113, 114) from U.S. agricultural 
industries the coefficient associated with trade costs measure is consistently negative 
across all specifications, however, it is not statistically significant.    Increased trade 
exposure does not appear to play an essential role in determining the establishment 
exit in agricultural industries.     
Approximately 50 percent of the manufacturing industries show the extensive 
margin effects: establishment death and variable trade costs have the expected 
negative association with statistical significance.    Among the manufacturing 
industries, the trade costs measure has a relatively larger effect on establishment 
death in the textile related industries, including textiles and fabrics, textile mill 
products, and apparel products.    In those three industries, the coefficient on trade 
costs is consistently negative and statistically significant at the 5% level after 
controlling for the set of establishment and market characteristics.    It implies that     80 
 
 
the chances of establishment death will increase when trade costs decline.    In 
addition, the extensive margin hypothesis is also verified in metal production related 
industries, including primary metal manufacturing, fabricated metal products, 
machinery, expect electrical, food products, printed matter products, plastic and 
rubber products and transportation equipment subsectors.    For the remaining 
subsectors, such as computer and electronic products, electrical equipment, 
appliances and component, and so forth, the association between trade and business 
dynamics is not statistically significant.     
Overall, the estimation results of establishment death by industry shows 
substantial variation.    In high-end manufacturing, survival of establishments is 
likely dependent on innovation, management and other factors, especially in the 
United States which is often the technological leader.    Hence, the effects of trade 
costs on establishment appear less relevant.    On the contrary, in the relatively more 
competitive and low-tech industries, for example, apparel and accessories, primary 
metal manufacturing, trade costs play a critical role in business dynamics.    For 
those industries under more exposure to trade, establishments have to seize market 
sales and gain profits in the competition with foreign establishments.    Foreign 
companies might have the advantage of lower costs of labor or intermediate 
materials, and hence, gain shares in U.S. markets.     
In sum, for the majority of U.S. manufacturing industries, the extensive margin     81 
 
 
effects can be verified, that as trade costs fall, establishments are more likely to fail.   
This is consistent with the model prediction that aggregate productivity within an 
industry increases due to exit of the least productive establishments, and resource 
reallocation toward more efficient establishments.     
 
7.3 Establishment Entry Equations for the U.S. Private Industry   
In order to comprehensively explore the association between business dynamics and 
variable trade costs, the effects of changing trade costs on establishment birth are 
also considered.    Estimation results of the U.S. private industry using the 
1998-2009 trade costs are reported across nine columns in table 7.4, with the second 
and third columns focusing on trade costs measure and subsequent columns 
including additional establishment and market characteristics.    A set of year and 
state dummy variables are included in specification 2-9.    On the basis of likelihood 
ratio tests, the ninth specification is the preferred model, i.e. the last column of table 
7.4.    Note that in this logistic regression model, the dependent variable is the odds 
of establishment birth in the log form.    From table 7.4 it is apparent that there does 
not exist a consistent and statistically significant association between variable trade 
costs and establishment birth.    Among controls, the wage level and market size 
appear most relevant than others.    The variable log(wage), proxying for 
productivity, has a positive and significant association with establishment birth at the     82 
 
 
1% level of significance.    Market size negatively influences the establishment birth, 
keeping all else constant, likely due to competitive pressures in a large market.     
Table 7.5 reports the regression results of establishment birth equation using the 
2008-2009 trade costs measure across eight columns as a robustness check.    The 
conclusion with respect to the effects of changing trade costs on establishment birth 
is unchanged.    Results on controls are qualitatively similar to those in table 7.4 
 
7.4 Establishment Entry Equations by Major U.S. Three-Digit NAICS Industries   
We also examine the potential effects of trade costs on establishment birth by each 
U.S. three-digit NAICS industry.    The SUSB database from U.S. Census Bureau is 
accessed.    The same as in the private industries, we employ the establishment birth 
equation to explore how trade costs affect firm entry.    The coefficients associated 
with the trade costs measure in different specifications are reported across nine 
columns in table 7.6 with each row representing a three-digit NAICS industry.  All 
the coefficients associated with other regressors have been suppressed.   
Different from the estimation results in the establishment death equation, the 
coefficient associated with trade costs measure does not show statistical significance 
in the majority of all 24 three-digit NAICS industries.    It indicates that the variable 
trade costs are not significantly related to establishment birth.    However, there are a 
few exceptions.    In the industry of chemicals, the coefficient associated with the     83 
 
 
trade costs measure is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level in the 
preferred model.  As bilateral or multilateral trade barriers have been reduced, 
foreign chemical companies will enter the U.S. market or increase the foreign direct 
investment in the U.S. market.    The domestic new establishments should have 
strong competitiveness and relatively higher productivity level to seize market shares 
from foreign companies and gain non-negative profits in order to survive in the 
markets.    On the other hand, we find a negative association between establishment 
birth and variable trade costs consistently across all variants in some industries, like 
textile mill products, apparel and accessories.    The potential reason to explain this 
phenomenon is that as increasing trade costs lead to higher total costs of production 
and operation, new establishments will be more cautious to decide to enter the 
market.    Overall, the variable trade costs do not play an important role on the 
establishment birth in the majorities of subsectors from both U.S. agricultural and 
manufacturing industries. 
 
7.5 Estimation Results of Job Destruction in Contracting Establishments 
The intensive margin hypothesis testing begins with examining job destruction in 
surviving or continuing firms, which have contracted during the sample periods.   
Recall that the dependent variable is expressed as the ratio of job losses to total 
employment in the subset of surviving, but shrinking, firms.    As before, alternative     84 
 
 
specifications controlling for establishment and market characteristics are estimated.    
The results using the 1998-2009 trade costs measure are reported across nine 
columns in table 7.7, with the second and third columns reporting results focusing on 
our trade costs measure only and subsequent columns including various sets of 
additional establishment and market characteristics.  Except for the second column, 
results are reported with year fixed effects.    Again, for the period 1998-2009, the 
sample size covering 28 U.S. states that have customs districts is 308.    In order to 
alleviate endogeneity concerns, one-year lagged explanatory variables are used on 
the right hand side of these specifications. 
The second column of table 7.7 focuses only on the variable trade costs of 
interest without year and state fixed effects.    It indicates that job destruction and 
variable trade costs have the expected negative association: as trade costs fall, the 
ratio of job destruction to total employment increases.    After adding a set of year 
dummy variables into model, the trade costs’ coefficient remains negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level (column 3, table 7.7).    Columns three to nine 
adds in establishment characteristics as well as market size.    Except for the first 
specification, the coefficient on trade costs remains negative and statistically 
significant in the case of job destruction by continuing, but contracting 
establishments.    The magnitude of the trade costs’ coefficient does not vary much 
with additional controls of establishment and market characteristics as is the level of     85 
 
 
significance. 
Based on the likelihood ratio test, the ninth specification is the preferred model, 
which is displayed in the last column of table 7.7.    Here, as noted above, the 
coefficient associated with trade costs measure is negative and statistically 
significant.    It implies that contracting continuers in the market will lose jobs when 
trade costs decline, which is consistent with underlying hypothesis of intensive 
margin effects (Melitz, 2003).    The intensified intra-industry competition causes the 
less efficient establishments to lose market sales and profits.    In order to survive, 
they would cut operation cost, such as labor or employment.    When the 
international trade costs relative to domestic trade costs decrease by 100%, the 
estimated ratio of job destruction will raise by 6.14%, holding all else constant. 
The coefficient on Startup (proportion of young establishments in total) is 
positive and statistically significant, is expected.    Having more start-ups then 
implies an increased likelihood of job losses, ceteris paribus.    Such firms are known 
to have large turnovers in employment (Haltiwanger et al., 2010).    Also, the 
coefficient on log(wage) is not statistically significant in this and other specifications.   
The coefficient on multi-establishment status is positive and significant at the 1% 
level.    The latter result is anticipated since multi-plant firms have the flexibility to 
adjust employment due to external shocks.    Market size is also a relevant factor in 
job destruction, with its coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level.    This     86 
 
 
result arises because establishments located in the relatively larger market may 
endure more competitive pressures from both local and importing firms. 
For a robustness check, a second set of specifications are estimated using the 
2008-2009 trade costs, where the sample size is 49.    Results are displayed across 
columns 2-9 in table 7.8 with the second column focusing on the trade cost measure 
of interest and subsequent columns including establishment characteristics and 
market size.    Given the cross-sectional data structure, year fixed effects are not 
included.    Across all variants, the coefficient on trade costs remains negatively 
related to job destruction, but the magnitude of this effect is much larger than that 
when using the 1998-2009 trade costs measure.    It suggests that the potential effect 
of changing trade costs on resource reallocation is intense in the later period of the 
sample.    The preferred specification, five, shows that when international trade costs 
relative to domestic trade costs decrease by 100%, the estimated ratio of job 
destruction rises 38.94%, all else constant.    With respect to controls, the coefficient 
on Startup and multi-establishment firms takes the same sign as in table 7.7, with 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
7.6 Estimation Results of Job Creation by Expanding Establishments 
The estimation results of job creation by expanding establishments are reported 
across nine columns in table 7.9, with the second and third columns focusing on our     87 
 
 
trade costs measure, and subsequent columns having additional establishment and 
market characteristics.  The response variable of this regression model is the ratio 
of job creation by expanding establishments to total employment within U.S. private 
industry by each state during 1998-2009.    Except for the second column, results are 
reported with year fixed effects.    A one-year lag of explanatory variables is used in 
the right hand side of these specifications to alleviate possible endogeneity.     
Based on the likelihood ratio test, the ninth specification is the preferred model, 
i.e. the last column of table 7.9.    However, results across all specifications do not 
show a negative and statistically significant association between ratio of job creation 
by expanding establishments and trade costs.    All establishment and market 
characteristics, by contrast, do significantly relate to the response variable.    The 
coefficient on Startup is positive and statistically significant.    Recall that a positive 
coefficient was obtained in job destruction models as well.    The relatively young 
establishments have more potential, but also face risks.    A recent study by the 
Center for Economic Studies showed that relatively young and small firms created 
and lost a large share of jobs in the United States (Haltiwanger et al. 2010)
20.  In 
contrast to the job destruction equation, the variable log(wage) has a positive and 
statistically significant association with job creation at the 1% level.      As noted 
earlier, the wage level could be proxy for the establishment’s productivity.    During 
trade liberalization, only most efficient establishments that can gain both market     88 
 
 
sales and profits could expand the scale of employment.    The coefficient on 
multi-establishment status is positive and significant at the 1% level in the job 
creation and destruction models.    This signals firm flexibility in adjusting scale 
based on the competitive environment.    Finally, the coefficient on market size is 
also positive and significant at the 1% level. This indicates again that large markets 
face substantial churning of resources (job destruction and creation).     
Similar to the hypotheses above, specifications using the 2008-2009 trade costs 
allow for a robustness check.    Results are displayed in columns 2-9 in Table 7.10 
with the second column focusing on the trade cost measure of interest, and 
subsequent columns having establishment characteristics and market size.   
Different from the results in Table 7.9, the coefficient on trade costs is negative with 
statistical significance in several specifications (Table 7.10).    The negative sign is 
consistent with the intensive margin based on intra-industry resource reallocation, 
which is common in heterogeneous firms models.    The fifth specification, column 6 
of Table 7.10, is the most preferred model based on likelihood ratio tests.    Here, 
when the international trade costs relative to domestic trade costs decrease by 100%, 
the estimated ratio of job creation by expanding establishments relative to total 
employment rises by 35.67%, ceteris paribus.    Startup, log(wage) and 
multi-establishment status remain key factors related to job creation by expanding 
establishments.     89 
 
 
7.7 Estimation Results of Net Job Creation by Continuers 
In order to fully explore the potential effects of changing trade costs on the labor 
market of U.S. private industries, a net job creation equation is employed.    The 
estimation results using the 2008-2009 trade costs measure are reported in the last 
nine columns of Table 7.11, with the second and third columns focusing on our trade 
costs measure, and subsequent columns including various sets of additional 
establishment and market characteristics.  As before, the right hand side of this 
equation employs one-period lagged explanatory variables.    The second column of 
Table 7.11 focuses only on the variable trade costs of interest without year and state 
fixed effects.    The association between net job creation and trade costs measure is 
not statistically significant.    After adding set of year dummy variables into model, 
trade costs measure is still not significant.    The column three to nine adds in 
establishment characteristics as well as market size.    Across all nine specifications, 
a significant association between net job creation and trade costs is not found.   
Nevertheless, establishment characteristics, age and wage level, are significantly 
related to net job creation.    Furthermore, market size is also a relevant factor that 
influences net job creation; the significance level is 1%.    The negative sign on 
market size suggests that in recent years, large regions have not contributed to job 
creation.    In the robustness check in Table 7.20, the coefficient on trade costs 
remains positive and statistically significant in some specifications.    It would     90 
 
 
appear that job destruction arising from shrinking establishments is a stronger 
feature than job creation by expanding establishments.    The dominant job 
destruction effect coincides with the severe recession encountered during 2008-2009.   
Other control variables are largely in line with expectations and have an effect 
similar to that in Table 7.11. 
 
    
 
 
Table 7.1. Probability Of Death in the U.S. Private Industry, 1998-2009 
       
Regressors   
Logit: Deaths of Establishments, 1998-2009 
Specification 
One 
Specification 
Two 
Specification 
Three 
Specification 
Four 
Specification 
Five 
Specification 
Six 
Specification 
Seven 
Specification 
Eight 
Specification 
Nine 
Trade Cost  -0.092
*** 
(0.022) 
-0.146
*** 
(0.045) 
-0.119
*** 
(0.044) 
-0.095
** 
(0.042) 
-0.122
*** 
(0.043) 
-0.085
** 
(0.042) 
-0.136
*** 
(0.044) 
-0.094
** 
(0.042) 
-0.080
** 
(0.042) 
Startup      1.938
*** 
(0.437) 
  0.931
* 
(0.542) 
1.010
** 
(0.491) 
1.235
*** 
（0.395） 
  1.256
** 
(0.511) 
Log (employment)      -0.423
*** 
(0.114) 
  -0.424
*** 
(0.113) 
       
Log(wage)        -0.787
*** 
(0.134) 
  -0.879
*** 
(0.140) 
  -0.779
*** 
(0.134) 
-0.887
*** 
(0.140) 
Ratio of multi plant 
firm 
      -2.033
*** 
(0.422) 
-1.816
*** 
(0.595) 
-1.217
** 
(0.578) 
  -2.123
*** 
(0.431) 
-1.171
** 
(0.576) 
Market Size 
 
            -0.160
 
(0.109) 
-0.100 
(0.098) 
-0.171
* 
(0.101) 
                   
State fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  308  308  308  308  308  308  308  308  308 
Log likelihood  -36304.59  -6322.50  -5974.75  -5554.68  -5830.57  -5494.61  -6156.88  -5539.54  -5454.14 
C Statistic  0.508  0.530  0.531  0.532  0.531  0.533  0.530  0.532  0.533 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Coefficients for the intercept and dummies are suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.   
 
91   
 
 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Coefficients for the intercept and dummies are suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.   
 
 
Table 7.2. Probability Of Death in the U.S. Private Industry, 2008-2009 
 
Regressors   
Logit: Deaths of Establishments, 2008-2009 
Specification 
One 
Specification 
Two 
Specification 
Three 
Specification 
Four 
Specification 
Five 
Specification 
Six 
Specification 
Seven 
Specification 
Eight 
Trade Cost  -0.114
 
(0.137) 
-0.147
* 
(0.091) 
-0.367
*** 
(0.135) 
-0.148
* 
(0.093) 
-0.169
** 
(0.074) 
-0.140
 
(0.091) 
-0.100
 
(0.144) 
-0.159
* 
(0.086) 
Startup    3.574
*** 
(0.289) 
  3.557
*** 
(0.322) 
3.159
*** 
(0.284) 
3.567
*** 
（0.291） 
  3.119
*** 
(0.338) 
Log (employment)    -0.026
* 
(0.015) 
  -0.025
* 
(0.015) 
       
Log(wage)      -0.387
*** 
(0.130) 
  -0.236
*** 
(0.069) 
  -0.603
*** 
(0.131) 
  -0.247
*** 
(0.085) 
Ratio of multi plant 
firm 
    -1.667
*** 
(0.406) 
-0.028
 
(0.228) 
-0.447
* 
(0.238) 
  -1.909
*** 
(0.370) 
-0.472
* 
(0.265) 
Market Size 
 
          -0.024
* 
(0.015) 
  0.087
*** 
(0.024) 
0.004 
(0.017) 
                 
Observations  49  49  49  49  49  49  49  49 
Log likelihood  -6535.69  -1648.42  -4711.38  -1647.95  -1432.72  -1659.38  -3703.72  -1431.30 
C statistic  0.498  0.533  0.522  0.534  0.535  0.533  0.525  0.535 
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Table  7.3.  The  Coefficient  of  Trade  Costs  in  the  Establishment  Death  Equation  of  Each  U.S.  Three-Digit  NAICS  Industry, 
1999-2006 
 
Ind  Description  S1  S2  S3  S4  S5  S6  S7  S8  S9 
113  Forestry products 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.05
 
(0.04) 
-0.04
 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.04
 
(0.04) 
-0.01
 
(0.04) 
-0.01
 
(0.04) 
114 
Fish, fresh, chilled, or frozen and other 
marine products 
-0.06 
(0.10) 
-0.06 
(0.10) 
-0.04 
(0.15) 
-0.19
* 
(0.11) 
-0.03 
(0.13) 
-0.20
* 
(0.12) 
-0.05 
(0.10) 
-0.11 
(0.17) 
-0.18 
(0.19) 
311  Food and kindred products 
-0.16
*** 
(0.04) 
-0.16
*** 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.10
** 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.003 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.08
* 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
0.04 
312  Beverages and tobacco products 
0.06 
(0.10) 
0.05 
(0.10) 
0.08 
(0.10) 
0.14
 
(0.10) 
0.12 
(0.10) 
0.15 
(0.10) 
0.06 
(0.11) 
0.07 
(0.10) 
0.09 
(0.10) 
313  Textiles and fabrics 
-0.33
*** 
(0.09) 
-0.32
*** 
(0.08) 
-0.21
** 
(0.08) 
-0.29
*** 
(0.10) 
-0.18
* 
(0.09) 
-0.15
 
(0.10) 
-0.22
** 
(0.09) 
-0.25
** 
(0.10) 
-0.15 
(0.10) 
314  Textile mill products 
-0.33
*** 
(0.06) 
-0.33
*** 
(0.06) 
-0.28
*** 
(0.06) 
-0.34
*** 
(0.06) 
-0.20
*** 
(0.07) 
-0.27
*** 
(0.07) 
-0.17
** 
(0.07) 
-0.22
*** 
(0.07) 
-0.19
*** 
(0.07) 
315  Apparel and accessories 
-0.32
*** 
(0.08) 
-0.32
*** 
(0.08) 
-0.18
** 
(0.08) 
-0.29
*** 
(0.08) 
-0.13
 
(0.09) 
-0.29
*** 
(0.09) 
-0.19
** 
(0.09) 
-0.21
** 
(0.09) 
-0.24
*** 
(0.08) 
316  Leather and allied products 
-0.09 
(0.08) 
-0.09 
(0.08) 
-0.04 
(0.10) 
-0.08 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.10) 
-0.03 
(0.09) 
-0.08 
(0.11) 
-0.14 
(0.12) 
-0.05 
(0.12) 
321  Wood products 
-0.04
* 
(0.03) 
-0.05
** 
(0.02) 
-0.002 
(0.02) 
-0.06
** 
(0.03) 
-0.002 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.002 
(0.02) 
-0.06
** 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
322  Paper 
-0.10
*** 
(0.03) 
-0.09
*** 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.08
** 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
323  Printed matter and related products  -0.18
***  -0.18
***  -0.09
***  -0.19
***  -0.10
***  -0.11
***  -0.08
***  -0.12
***  -0.10
*** 
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(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
324  Petroleum and coal products 
-0.06 
(0.17) 
-0.02 
(0.18) 
-0.01 
(0.18) 
-0.03 
(0.18) 
-0.06 
(0.17) 
0.004 
(0.18) 
-0.002 
(0.18) 
-0.05 
(0.18) 
-0.02 
(0.19) 
325  Chemicals 
-0.08
** 
(0.04) 
-0.07
** 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.09
*** 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
326  Plastics and rubber products 
-0.23
*** 
(0.04) 
-0.22
*** 
(0.04) 
-0.15
*** 
(0.03) 
-0.16
*** 
(0.03) 
-0.16
*** 
(0.04) 
-0.13
*** 
(0.03) 
-0.16
*** 
(0.04) 
-0.17
*** 
(0.04) 
-0.16
*** 
(0.04) 
327  Nonmetallic mineral products 
-0.08
* 
(0.05) 
-0.07
 
(0.05) 
-0.04
 
(0.05) 
-0.09
* 
(0.05) 
-0.04
 
(0.05) 
-0.03
 
(0.05) 
-0.05
 
(0.05) 
-0.10
** 
(0.05) 
-0.04
 
(0.05) 
331  Primary metal manufacturing 
-0.26
*** 
(0.08) 
-0.27
*** 
(0.06) 
-0.14
** 
(0.06) 
-0.20
*** 
(0.07) 
-0.13
** 
(0.06) 
-0.10 
(0.07) 
-0.14
** 
(0.06) 
-0.19
** 
(0.07) 
-0.09 
(0.08) 
332  Fabricated metal products 
-0.30
*** 
(0.07) 
-0.29
*** 
(0.06) 
-0.14
*** 
(0.05) 
-0.36
*** 
(0.05) 
-0.09
** 
(0.05) 
-0.13
*** 
(0.05) 
-0.15
*** 
(0.05) 
-0.30
*** 
(0.06) 
-0.15
*** 
(0.05) 
333  Machinery, except electrical 
-0.25
*** 
(0.07) 
-0.24
*** 
(0.06) 
-0.10
* 
(0.05) 
-0.28
*** 
(0.07) 
-0.10
* 
(0.05) 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
-0.07
 
(0.05) 
-0.20
*** 
(0.07) 
-0.08
 
(0.06) 
334  Computer and electronic products   
-0.11
** 
(0.05) 
-0.10
** 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
0.002 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.06) 
335 
Electrical equipment, appliances, and 
component 
-0.13
*** 
(0.05) 
-0.13
*** 
(0.05) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.11
** 
(0.05) 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.003 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
336  Transportation equipment 
-0.08
** 
(0.04) 
-0.07
* 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.22
*** 
(0.04) 
-0.04
 
(0.05) 
-0.08
* 
(0.05) 
-0.04
 
(0.04) 
-0.18
*** 
(0.05) 
-0.07 
(0.05) 
337  Furniture and fixtures   
-0.19
*** 
(0.03) 
-0.19
*** 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.16
*** 
(0.03) 
-0.03
 
(0.03) 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.12
*** 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
339  Miscellaneous manufactured commodities 
-0.11
** 
(0.05) 
-0.11
** 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.08
* 
(0.05) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.07
* 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
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511 
Newspapers, books & other published matter, 
nesoi 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
 
Notes: The coefficient associated with the trade cost variable in the logistic regression of establishment death during 1999-2006 for nine specifications is shown in the table 
7.3.    Set of state and year dummies are included in the model. Standard deviations are in parentheses.    Coefficients for the intercept, other independent variables, and 
dummies are suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.   
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Table 7.4. Probability of Birth in U.S. Private Industries, 1998-2009 
       
Regressors   
Logit: Births of Establishments, 1998-2009 
Specification 
One 
Specification 
Two 
Specification 
Three 
Specification 
Four 
Specification 
Five 
Specification 
Six 
Specification 
Seven 
Specification 
Eight 
Specification 
Nine 
Trade Cost  -0.100
*** 
(0.029) 
0.051 
(0.036) 
0.054 
(0.036) 
0.026 
(0.036) 
0.053 
(0.036) 
0.029 
(0.036) 
0.060
* 
(0.036) 
0.028
 
(0.036) 
0.032 
(0.036) 
Startup      0.651
* 
(0.358) 
  0.545
 
(0.453) 
0.202 
(0.419) 
0.946
*** 
（0.315） 
  0.405 
(0.436) 
Log (employment)      0.051 
(0.096) 
  0.051
 
(0.096) 
       
Log(wage)        0.442
*** 
(0.117) 
  0.424
*** 
(0.123) 
  0.452
*** 
(0.117) 
  0.417
*** 
(0.123) 
Ratio of multi plant 
firm 
      -0.644
* 
(0.366) 
-0.195
 
(0.511) 
-0.476 
(0.506) 
  -0.753
** 
(0.372) 
-0.436 
(0.505) 
Market Size 
 
            -0.157
* 
(0.089) 
-0.123
 
(0.084) 
-0.146
* 
(0.088) 
                   
State fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  308  308  308  308  308  308  308  308  308 
Log likelihood  -67125.24  -4867.55  -4790.04  -4663.27  -4788.36  -4660.72  -4758.04  -4639.97  -4630.49 
AIC  134254.47  9813.10  9662.07  9408.54  9660.72  9405.44  9598.08  9363.94  9346.99 
C Statistic  0.511  0.541  0.542  0.543  0.542  0.543  0.542  0.543  0.543 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Coefficients for the intercept and dummies are suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.   
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Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Coefficients for the intercept and dummies are suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.   
Table 7.5. Probability of Birth in the U.S. Private Industries, 2008-2009   
Regressors   
Logit: Births of Establishments, 2008-2009 
Specification 
One 
Specification 
Two 
Specification 
Three 
Specification 
Four 
Specification 
Five 
Specification 
Six 
Specification 
Seven 
Specification 
Eight 
Trade Cost  -0.164
 
(0.127) 
0.003 
(0.059) 
-0.245
* 
(0.140) 
0.015 
(0.059) 
0.005 
(0.049) 
-0.004
 
(0.060) 
0.074
 
(0.147) 
0.017 
(0.057) 
Startup    3.241
*** 
(0.189) 
  3.352
*** 
(0.207) 
3.635
*** 
(0.190) 
3.248
*** 
（0.191） 
  3.588
*** 
(0.223) 
Log (employment)    0.022
** 
(0.010) 
  0.021
** 
(0.010) 
       
Log(wage)      -0.035
 
(0.135) 
  0.143
*** 
(0.046) 
  -0.269
** 
(0.133) 
  0.131
** 
(0.056) 
Ratio of multi- 
plant firm 
    -0.956
** 
(0.423) 
0.184
 
(0.146) 
0.448
*** 
(0.159) 
  -1.204
*** 
(0.375) 
0.420
** 
(0.174) 
Market Size 
 
          0.020
** 
(0.010) 
0.098
*** 
(0.025) 
0.005 
(0.011) 
                 
Observations  49  49  49  49  49  49  49  49 
Log likelihood  -4791.19  -752.39  -4269.35    -735.22  -691.89  -760.21  -3212.75  -690.20 
AIC  9586.39  1512.78  8546.69    1480.44  1393.77  1528.42  6435.50  1392.41 
C Statistic  0.508  0.532  0.514  0.533  0.534  0.533  0.520  0.534 
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Table  7.6.  The  Coefficient  of  Trade  Costs  in  the  Establishment  Birth  Equation  of  Each  U.S.  Three-Digit  NAICS  Industry, 
1999-2006 
Ind  Description  S1  S2  S3  S4  S5  S6  S7  S8  S9 
113  Forestry products 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.03
 
(0.04) 
-0.01
 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.03
 
(0.04) 
-0.02
 
(0.04) 
-0.02
 
(0.04) 
114 
Fish, fresh, chilled, or frozen and other 
marine products 
-0.02 
(0.07) 
-0.03 
(0.08) 
-0.21
* 
(0.11) 
-0.09
 
(0.08) 
-0.24
** 
(0.11) 
-0.09
 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.09) 
-0.16 
(0.13) 
-0.25
* 
(0.14) 
311  Food and kindred products 
-0.20
*** 
(0.06) 
-0.20
*** 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.21
*** 
(0.06) 
-0.09
* 
(0.05) 
-0.07 
(0.05) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.18
*** 
(0.06) 
-0.08 
0.05 
312  Beverages and tobacco products 
-0.10 
(0.09) 
-0.06 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
-0.04
 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
-0.04 
(0.09) 
0.02 
(0.09) 
313  Textiles and fabrics 
-0.57
*** 
(0.15) 
-0.58
*** 
(0.15) 
-0.24
* 
(0.12) 
-0.37
** 
(0.15) 
-0.18
 
(0.14) 
-0.25
 
(0.16) 
-0.30
* 
(0.16) 
-0.36
** 
(0.16) 
-0.26 
(0.16) 
314  Textile mill products 
-0.41
*** 
(0.08) 
-0.42
*** 
(0.08) 
-0.33
*** 
(0.08) 
-0.42
*** 
(0.08) 
-0.32
*** 
(0.09) 
-0.32
*** 
(0.09) 
-0.32
*** 
(0.09) 
-0.37
*** 
(0.09) 
-0.31
*** 
(0.10) 
315  Apparel and accessories 
-0.52
*** 
(0.10) 
-0.51
*** 
(0.10) 
-0.46
*** 
(0.10) 
-0.18
* 
(0.09) 
-0.31
*** 
(0.10) 
-0.18
* 
(0.09) 
-0.33
*** 
(0.11) 
-0.18
* 
(0.10) 
-0.19
* 
(0.10) 
316  Leather and allied products 
-0.33
*** 
(0.09) 
-0.32
*** 
(0.09) 
-0.20
* 
(0.11) 
-0.30
*** 
(0.09) 
-0.22
* 
(0.11) 
-0.20
** 
(0.10) 
-0.06 
(0.12) 
-0.16 
(0.13) 
-0.09 
(0.13) 
321  Wood products 
-0.08
** 
(0.03) 
-0.08
** 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.08
** 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.004 
(0.03) 
-0.07
* 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
322  Paper 
-0.08
* 
(0.04) 
-0.09
* 
(0.04) 
0.002 
(0.05) 
-0.10
** 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.09 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
323  Printed matter and related products  -0.15
***  -0.15
***  0.01
  -0.19
***  -0.01  -0.06
  0.05
  -0.04  -0.01
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(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04) 
324  Petroleum and coal products 
0.08 
(0.24) 
-0.01 
(0.24) 
0.02 
(0.25) 
0.02 
(0.24) 
-0.04 
(0.23) 
0.10 
(0.24) 
0.03 
(0.24) 
-0.03 
(0.24) 
0.08 
(0.25) 
325  Chemicals 
-0.01
 
(0.05) 
-0.02
 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.04
 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.08
* 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
326  Plastics and rubber products 
-0.14
*** 
(0.05) 
-0.14
*** 
(0.05) 
-0.06
 
(0.05) 
-0.06
 
(0.05) 
-0.09
** 
(0.05) 
-0.02
 
(0.05) 
-0.08
 
(0.05) 
-0.11
** 
(0.05) 
-0.09
* 
(0.05) 
327  Nonmetallic mineral products 
-0.05
 
(0.08) 
-0.06
 
(0.07) 
0.01
 
(0.07) 
-0.14
** 
(0.07) 
-0.08
 
(0.07) 
-0.04
 
(0.07) 
-0.02
 
(0.07) 
-0.17
** 
(0.07) 
-0.09
 
(0.07) 
331  Primary metal manufacturing 
-0.29
*** 
(0.09) 
-0.28
*** 
(0.08) 
-0.06
 
(0.07) 
-0.29
*** 
(0.09) 
-0.07
 
(0.07) 
-0.11 
(0.09) 
-0.07
 
(0.07) 
-0.33
*** 
(0.09) 
-0.16
* 
(0.09) 
332  Fabricated metal products 
-0.20
** 
(0.09) 
-0.21
** 
(0.08) 
-0.05
 
(0.06) 
-0.31
*** 
(0.07) 
0.01
 
(0.06) 
-0.02
 
(0.06) 
-0.08
 
(0.06) 
-0.31
*** 
(0.08) 
-0.10
 
(0.06) 
333  Machinery, except electrical 
-0.22
** 
(0.10) 
-0.24
** 
(0.10) 
-0.06 
(0.08) 
-0.43
*** 
(0.10) 
-0.07 
(0.08) 
-0.12 
(0.09) 
-0.02
 
(0.09) 
-0.28
*** 
(0.11) 
-0.10
 
(0.09) 
334  Computer and electronic products   
-0.07 
(0.07) 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.07) 
-0.04 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.01 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
335 
Electrical equipment, appliances, and 
component 
-0.21
*** 
(0.06) 
-0.22
*** 
(0.06) 
-0.10
* 
(0.06) 
-0.16
** 
(0.07) 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
-0.11 
(0.07) 
-0.13 
(0.08) 
-0.11 
(0.08) 
336  Transportation equipment 
0.03
 
(0.06) 
0.03
 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.17
*** 
(0.06) 
0.04
 
(0.06) 
-0.03
 
(0.06) 
0.04
 
(0.05) 
-0.15
** 
(0.06) 
-0.04 
(0.06) 
337  Furniture and fixtures   
-0.25
*** 
(0.06) 
-0.25
*** 
(0.06) 
-0.07 
(0.05) 
-0.16
*** 
(0.05) 
-0.06
 
(0.05) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.09 
(0.06) 
-0.17
*** 
(0.05) 
-0.07 
(0.05) 
339 
Miscellaneous manufactured 
commodities 
-0.07
 
(0.06) 
-0.07
 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.04
 
(0.06) 
-0.07 
(0.05) 
-0.01
 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
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511 
Newspapers, books & other published 
matter, nesoi 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
 
 
Notes: The coefficient associated with the trade cost variable in the logistic regression of establishment births during 1999-2006 for nine specifications is shown in the table 
7.6.    Set of state and year dummies are included in the model. Standard deviations are in parentheses.    Coefficients for the intercept, other independent variables, and 
dummies are suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
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Table 7.7. Ratio of Job Destruction by Continuers in the U.S. Private Industry, 1998-2009 
Regressors   
OLS: Job destruction by continuers, 1998-2009 
Specification 
One 
Specification 
Two 
Specification 
Three 
Specification 
Four 
Specification 
Five 
Specification 
Six 
Specification 
Seven 
Specification 
Eight 
Specification 
Nine 
Trade Cost  -0.003
 
(0.002) 
-0.003
** 
(0.001) 
-0.002
* 
(0.001) 
-0.005
*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003
*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003
*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002
* 
(0.001) 
-0.004
*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003
*** 
(0.001) 
Startup      0.067
*** 
(0.013) 
  0.087
*** 
(0.013) 
0.102
*** 
(0.012) 
0.062
*** 
(0.013) 
  0.090
*** 
(0.014) 
Log (employment)      0.003
*** 
(0.0004) 
  0.001
** 
(0.0004) 
       
Log(wage)        0.002
 
(0.002) 
  0.004
** 
(0.002) 
  -0.003 
(0.002) 
  0.003 
(0.002) 
Ratio of multi plant 
firm 
      0.069
*** 
(0.009) 
0.057
*** 
(0.010) 
0.069
*** 
(0.008) 
  0.034
*** 
(0.010) 
0.058
*** 
(0.010) 
Market Size 
 
            0.003
*** 
(0.0003) 
0.003
*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0008
* 
(0.001) 
                   
Year fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  308  308  308  308  308  308  308  308  308 
Log likelihood  939.29  1080.58  1129.52  1111.77  1145.09  1145.01  1130.87  1126.80  1146.19 
AIC  -1872.58  -2135.16  -2229.04  -2193.53  -2258.19  -2258.04  -2231.75  -2221.59  -2258.39 
Adjusted R
2  0.004  0.588  0.698  0.662  0.727  0.726  0.701  0.692  0.728 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Coefficients for the intercept and dummies are suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.   
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Table 7.8. Ratio of Job Destruction by Continuers in the U.S. Private Industry, 2008-2009 
Regressors   
OLS: Job destruction by continuers, 2008-2009 
Specification 
One 
Specification 
Two 
Specification 
Three 
Specification 
Four 
Specification 
Five 
Specification 
Six 
Specification 
Seven 
Specification 
Eight 
Trade Cost  -0.028
** 
(0.012) 
-0.021
** 
(0.010) 
-0.030
** 
(0.012) 
-0.023
*** 
(0.009) 
-0.023
*** 
(0.008) 
-0.020
** 
(0.010) 
-0.019
 
(0.012) 
-0.023
*** 
(0.009) 
Startup    0.222
*** 
(0.036) 
  0.281
*** 
(0.035) 
0.265
*** 
(0.033) 
0.220
*** 
（0.035） 
  0.265
*** 
(0.037) 
Log (employment)    0.002
* 
(0.001) 
  -0.001
 
(0.002) 
       
Log(wage)      -0.023
** 
(0.011) 
  -0.010 
(0.007) 
  -0.026
** 
(0.010) 
  -0.010 
(0.008) 
Ratio of multi plant 
firm 
    0.004 
(0.036) 
0.107
*** 
(0.028) 
0.084
*** 
(0.026) 
  -0.042 
(0.040) 
0.084
*** 
(0.033) 
Market Size 
 
          0.003
* 
(0.001) 
0.004
** 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
                 
Observations  49  49  49  49  49  49  49  49 
Log likelihood  147.48  163.35  150.07  169.61  170.31  163.81  152.45  170.31 
AIC  -288.96  -316.71  -290.14  -327.23  -328.63  -317.62  -292.91  -326.63 
Adjusted R
2  0.080  0.497  0.135  0.602  0.613  0.506  0.198  0.604 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Coefficients for the intercept and dummies are suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.   
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Table 7.9. Ratio of Job Expansion by Continuers in the U.S. Private Industry, 1998-2009 
Regressors   
OLS: Job expansion by continuers, 1998-2009 
Specification 
One 
Specification 
Two 
Specification 
Three 
Specification 
Four 
Specification 
Five 
Specification 
Six 
Specification 
Seven 
Specification 
Eight 
Specification 
Nine 
Trade Cost  0.0003
 
(0.003) 
0.0001 
(0.003) 
0.0001 
(0.001) 
-0.006
*** 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.0004
 
(0.001) 
-0.004
** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Startup      0.121
*** 
(0.017) 
  0.159
*** 
(0.015) 
0.276
*** 
(0.015) 
0.107
*** 
（0.017） 
  0.197
*** 
(0.016) 
Log (employment)      0.011
*** 
(0.001) 
  0.008
*** 
(0.001) 
       
Log(wage)        0.024
*** 
(0.004) 
  0.031
*** 
(0.003) 
    0.008
*** 
(0.003) 
  0.020
*** 
(0.003) 
Ratio of multi plant 
firm 
      0.206
*** 
(0.014) 
0.109
 
(0.012) 
0.205
*** 
(0.010) 
  0.081
*** 
(0.013) 
0.133
*** 
(0.012) 
Market Size 
 
            0.010
*** 
(0.001) 
  0.009
*** 
(0.001) 
  0.005
*** 
(0.001) 
                   
Year fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  308  308  308  308  308  308  308  308  308 
Log likelihood  829.80  854.89  1052.86  957.06  1090.90  1071.63  -1045.85  1046.84  1109.83 
AIC  -1653.61  -1683.78  -2075.72  -1884.11  -2149.80  -2111.26  -2061.70  -2061.68  -2185.67 
Adjusted R
2  0.001  0.119  0.755  0.543  0.808  0.782  0.743  0.744  0.829 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Coefficients for the intercept and dummies are suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.   
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Table 7.10. Ratio of Job Expansion by Continuers in the U.S. Private Industry, 2008-2009 
Regressors   
OLS: Job expansion by continuers, 2008-2009 
Specification 
One 
Specification 
Two 
Specification 
Three 
Specification 
Four 
Specification 
Five 
Specification 
Six 
Specification 
Seven 
Specification 
Eight 
Trade Cost  -0.025
*** 
(0.009) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.017
** 
(0.008 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
-0.014
** 
(0.007) 
-0.009
 
(0.008) 
-0.007
 
(0.008) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
Startup      0.026
 
(0.029) 
  0.042
 
(0.032) 
0.111
*** 
(0.029) 
0.026 
（0.030） 
    0.085
*** 
(0.030) 
Log (employment)    0.006
*** 
(0.001) 
  0.005
*** 
(0.001) 
       
Log(wage)      0.025
*** 
(0.007) 
  0.031
*** 
(0.006) 
  0.022
*** 
(0.006) 
0.027
***    
(0.006) 
Ratio of multi plant 
firm 
      0.091
*** 
(0.023) 
0.029
 
(0.026) 
0.125
*** 
(0.022) 
  0.050
** 
(0.024) 
0.090
*** 
(0.027) 
Market Size 
 
          0.005
*** 
(0.001) 
0.004
*** 
(0.001) 
0.003
** 
(0.001) 
                 
Observations  49  49  49  49  49  49  49  49 
Log likelihood  162.69  172.86  171.37  173.47  177.92  171.24  176.41  180.13 
AIC  -319.39  -335.71  -332.74  -334.94  -343.85  -332.47  -340.82  -346.26 
Adjusted R
2  0.116  0.390  0.352  0.392  0.493  0.348  0.460  0.526 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Coefficients for the intercept and dummies are suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.   
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Table 7.11. Ratio of Net Job Creation by Continuers in the U.S. Private Industry, 1998-2009 
Regressors   
OLS: Net job creation by continuers, 1998-2009 
Specification 
One 
Specification 
Two 
Specification 
Three 
Specification 
Four 
Specification 
Five 
Specification 
Six 
Specification 
Seven 
Specification 
Eight 
Specification 
Nine 
Trade Cost  -0.0003
 
(0.003) 
-0.0007 
(0.002) 
0.0003 
(0.002) 
-0.0002 
(0.002) 
0.0004 
(0.002) 
0.0005 
(0.002) 
0.0004
 
(0.002) 
-0.0004
 
(0.002) 
0.0006 
(0.002) 
Startup      0.046
** 
(0.018) 
  0.044
** 
(0.019) 
0.040
** 
(0.017) 
0.050
*** 
（0.018） 
  0.076
*** 
(0.020) 
Log (employment)      -0.001
** 
(0.0005) 
  -0.001
 
(0.001) 
       
Log(wage)        0.005
* 
(0.003) 
  0.006
** 
(0.003) 
  0.007
** 
(0.003) 
  0.011
*** 
(0.003) 
Ratio of multi plant 
firm 
      -0.020
* 
(0.011) 
-0.005
 
(0.015) 
-0.020
* 
(0.011) 
  -0.007 
(0.014) 
0.013 
(0.015) 
Market Size 
 
            -0.001
** 
(0.001) 
-0.001
 
(0.001) 
-0.002
*** 
(0.001) 
                   
Year fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  308  308  308  308  308  308  308  308  308 
Log likelihood  867.89  1021.14  1025.06  1023.84  1025.11  1026.45  1025.94  1024.91  1031.81 
AIC  -1729.79  -2016.28  -2020.11  -2017.67  -2018.23  -2020.90  -2021.88  -2017.82  -2029.61 
Adjusted R
2  0.000  0.617  0.624  0.621  0.623  0.626  0.743  0.622  0.829 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Coefficients for the intercept and dummies are suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.   
10 5   
 
 
Table 7.12. Ratio of Net Job Creation by Continuers in the U.S. Private Industry, 2008-2009 
Regressors   
OLS: Net job creation by continuers, 2008-2009 
Specification 
One 
Specification 
Two 
Specification 
Three 
Specification 
Four 
Specification 
Five 
Specification 
Six 
Specification 
Seven 
Specification 
Eight 
Trade Cost  0.041
*** 
(0.014) 
0.018 
(0.013) 
0.039
*** 
(0.014) 
0.020
* 
(0.012) 
0.034
*** 
(0.012) 
0.017
 
(0.012) 
0.017
 
(0.013) 
0.020
* 
(0.012) 
Startup    -0.154
*** 
(0.045) 
  -0.199
*** 
(0.049) 
-0.230
*** 
(0.050) 
-0.151
*** 
（0.044） 
  -0.169
*** 
(0.050) 
Log (employment)    -0.007
*** 
(0.001) 
  -0.005
** 
(0.002) 
       
Log(wage)      0.019
 
(0.013) 
  0.008 
(0.011) 
  0.026
** 
(0.011) 
0.016       
(0.010) 
Ratio of multi plant 
firm 
    -0.053 
(0.042) 
-0.082
** 
(0.039) 
-0.122
*** 
(0.038) 
  0.040 
(0.042) 
-0.040
 
(0.044) 
Market Size 
 
          -0.008
*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009
*** 
(0.002) 
-0.006
*** 
(0.002) 
                 
Observations  49  49  49  49  49  49  49  49 
Log likelihood  139.13  151.36  142.03  153.44  150.95  152.43  149.98  155.15 
AIC  -272.25  -292.72  -274.05  -294.87  -289.89  -294.86  -287.97  -296.30 
Adjusted R
2  0.123  0.444  0.187  0.478  0.422  0.468  0.399  0.502 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Coefficients for the intercept and dummies are suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.   
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CHAPTER 8 
8. GAINS FROM TRADE: THIS STUDY’S CONTRIBUTION 
   108 
 
 
8.1 Scale Economies, Monopolistic Competition and the Gains from Trade 
Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin models have been the primary conceptual 
frameworks for decades for examining causes and consequences of trade.    In the 
Ricardian model, trade occurs on the basis of differences in technology, while the 
difference in factor endowments is the motivation for trade in the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model.    Krugman (1979) was the among the few who pointed that even if two 
countries have the same preferences, technology, and factor endowments, trade and 
gains from trade can arise.    In Krugman’s model, trade is driven by economies of 
scale and product differentiation rather than differences in factor endowments in the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model, or in technology in the Ricardian model.    The model is a 
specific, extended version of the monopolistic competition model developed by 
Dixiz and Stiglitz (1977).    Consumers share the common utility function with 
constant elasticity of substitution preferences on the consumption side.    As for the 
production side, each firm produces only one differentiated product that differs from 
those of other firms to some extent under conditions of increasing returns to scale.   
Labor is the only factor of production, and all firms have the same fixed and 
marginal cost, i.e., firms are homogeneous.    As economies of scale are internal to 
firms, the market faces monopolistic competition.     
The equilibrium of the economy is given by: (i) the price of each product 
relative to wages (markup); (ii) the output of each good; (iii) the quantity of goods 109 
 
 
produced.    Krugman (1979) uses this model to analyze the effects of trade on the 
equilibrium markup, output, and the number of varieties available to consumers.   
Assuming that countries have the same preferences and technologies, Krugman 
(1979) incorporates trade openness with zero transportation cost.    The 
trade-induced effects include an increase in real wages, in the scale of production 
and in the number of varieties available for consumption.    Welfare in both trading 
partners will increase resulting from lower markup of each product and increased 
choices.    Nonetheless, production of some varieties will be shut down in both 
countries.    The latter should not be a concern if countries are face uniform 
distribution of economic activity within its borders.    Overall, increasing returns to 
scale can bring about trade and gains from trade even when there are no international 
differences in preferences, technology, or factor endowments. 
 
8.2 Heterogeneous Firms Model 
The introduction of heterogeneous firms into the monopolistic competition model is a 
notable progress in trade theory, in which the productivity levels of firms are different 
even within an industry (Melitz, 2003).    The heterogeneous firms model continues to 
employ the monopolistic competition framework with constant elasticity of 
substitution preferences.    However, on the production side, an industry characterized 
by heterogeneous firms arises because, before expending an irreversible cost to enter 110 
 
 
the industry, firms face uncertainty about their productivity realization.    After 
incurring the entry cost, they observe their productivity and choose either to exit if 
variable profit does not cover fixed production cost.  They serve only domestic 
markets if variable profit covers only fixed production cost; and serve domestic and 
foreign markets if variable profit covers fixed production and fixed foreign market 
entry costs. 
In an open economy with increased exposure to trade, all firms lose domestic 
sales under the intensified competition with foreign importing firms.    Less efficient 
firms can still survive but only serve in the domestic market.    In addition, trade 
encourages the domestic firms which are able to cover the fixed costs of exporting 
overseas to enter the export market.    The more efficient firms that serve both 
domestic and foreign markets can achieve higher sales.    Nevertheless, the direction 
of the profit change involves a tradeoff between the between the increase in total 
revenue and the increase in fixed cost due to the additional export costs.    Only the 
most efficient firms can gain both market shares and profits.    Thus, the overall 
distribution of market sales shifts toward the most efficient firms.    To summarize, 
trade liberalization in the presence of heterogeneous firms within an industry has two 
important competition-induced effects: (i) increase in average industry productivity, 
and (ii) resource reallocation within an industry.    The model emphasizes the 
intra-industry competition, where trade openness yields aggregate productivity gains 111 
 
 
through trade-induced resource reallocation towards more efficient firms. 
 
8.3 The Gains from Trade 
Referring to the model of scale economies and monopolistic competition (Krugman, 
1979; 1980; 1981; Helpman, 1981; Lancaster, 1980) and the model of heterogeneous 
firms (Melitz, 2003; Bernard et al., 2003; Helpman, 2006), there are three sources on 
the  gains  from  trade:  (i)  price  reductions  due  to  increasing  return  to  scale;  (ii) 
increased product variety available to consumers; and (iii) intra-industry reallocation 
of resources from changes to the extensive and intensive margins. 
 
8.3.1 Price Reductions   
The first source of the gains from trade, price reductions, is closely related to 
economies of scale.    It is one of the implications of the monopolistic competition 
model.    As tariff rates between two trading partners decline, the least efficient firms 
exit the market and the more efficient firms expand their production and reduce their 
average costs through increasing returns of scale.    In equilibrium, the decrease in 
average costs causes a decrease in prices.    Harris (1984a, 1984b) develops 
simulation models to detect the change in firm scale and production costs, following 
the Canada-United States free trade agreement.    With expanding scale and falling 
costs in various Canadian industries, he predicted that firm output would increase by 112 
 
 
40-70% along with an improvement in labor productivity of 20-30%.    However, 
Head and Ries (1999, 2001) finds no systematic evidence that Canadian firms grew 
more in the industries with the largest tariff rate reductions.    Tybout et al. (1991) 
focus on the impacts of trade liberalization in some developing countries, e.g. Chile, 
Mexico and find little indication that declining tariffs cause an expansion in firm 
scale.  With regard to the Single Market Program in Europe, Badinger (2007) uses 
sectoral data during 1981-1999 to find strong evidence of reductions in markups in 
manufacturing and construction sectors, but not in services.    Friberg (2001) agrees 
with the conclusion that the elimination of rules and policies between European 
countries will lower the ability of firms to price-discriminate and promote trade.         
 
8.3.2 Increased Product Variety 
The second gains from trade based on the implications of monopolistic competition 
model are more varieties of products available to consumers.    This area has 
received much attention in recent research using disaggregated data.    The gains 
from trade on the product variety are quite sensitive to the elasticity of substitution 
across products.    If the elasticity of substitution between one domestic product and 
one importing product is high, it implies that products from domestic and foreign 
market easily substitute for each other, and then consumers do not increase much 
utility for having a new variety of product.    Therefore, the measure of elasticity of 113 
 
 
substitution matters in assessing this gain.    Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimate 
elasticity of substitution for over 30,000 products available in the Harmonized 
System of trade data on the Tariff Schedule of the United States.    By combining the 
data of new importing products with the estimated elasticity of substitution, the gains 
from trade resulting from the increase of import varieties for the United State is 
estimated.    They find gains equivalent to 2.6% of U.S. GDP in 2001.    Thus, 
positive evidence that gains from having more product varieties from new supplying 
countries does exist.    Welfare of each resident will increase when more import 
varieties become available.     
Hummels and Klenow (2005) employ cross-sectional data of countries in 1996 
and compare the trade between larger and smaller countries.    They investigate the 
question: is growth in trade is driven by the extensive margin, or by the intensive 
margin.    Here, the extensive margin in trade means the range of products of 
exporting and importing.    The intensive margin in trade means the trading volume 
of each product.    They conclude that about two-thirds of growth in trade flows 
between countries is explained by the extensive margin, a more diverse range of 
goods from exporting and imports. And the other one-third of growth in trade is 
explained by the intensive margin, trading more of the same good.    Broda et al. 
(2006) explore the association between the new input variety and productivity 
growth.    They estimate that new import varieties can account for about 15% of 114 
 
 
growth in productivity in the United States.    Furthermore, the productivity gain 
could be higher in developing countries, since they depend more on imported 
intermediate materials. 
 
8.3.3 Intra-Industry Resource Reallocation 
The third source of gains from trade in the monopolistic competition model is the 
intra-industry reallocation of resources, with only more productive firms surviving 
and expanding scale after trade liberalization.    The extensive and intensive margin 
predictions have received a large amount of support from current empirical work 
using disaggregate data, e.g. firm-level or plant-level data sets.    For the case of the 
United States, Bernard et al. (2003) show that only a small proportion of firms are 
exporters, while these exporting firms are substantially more productive than other 
firms in the industry.    The same situation is also observed in France (Eaton et al., 
2004; 2011).    These studies demonstrate that firms with different levels of 
productivity coexist within an industry, and that there are heterogeneous responses to 
trade liberalization.     
Trefler (2004) focuses on the impact of the Canada-United States free trade 
agreement on the selection and productivity of firms utilizing firm-level data.    Due 
to the elimination of tariffs, low-productivity plants shut down, and 
high-productivity plants in Canadian manufacturing industries expanded their scale 115 
 
 
and outputs, and entered the U.S. market.    Such reallocation was most common to 
formerly protected industries.    When tariff rate declined, labor productivity 
increased by 15%, half of which is accounted by the closing of inefficient plants.   
In addition, Trefler (2004) also provides some evidence on how tariff elimination 
affects employment.    First of all, the employment of Canadian industries that relate 
to tariff was reduced by 12%.    Second, job destruction was a short-term impact, and 
employment in Canadian manufacturing industries did not fall over a ten-year period.   
To summarize, Trefler (2004) finds substantial evidence of intra-industry resource 
reallocation in Canadian industries after the Canada-United States free trade 
agreement.    The trade-induced 6% increase in average productivity growth of 
Canadian manufacturing industries led to higher wages and lower prices, which 
enhanced consumers’ welfare. 
Feenstra and Kee (2006) conduct a survey on 44 developing countries during 
1980-2000 and find that gains from trade via such reallocation are also substantial.   
Over this period of increased globalization, the variety of goods which were 
produced in developing countries and exported to U.S. increased by 4.6% per year.   
The increased varieties of export products accounts for a 4.5% productivity growth 
for those exporters which are developing countries.    The gains for the firms in those 
countries switching to exports are actually larger than the U.S. gains of 2.6% of GDP 
from expanding import variety. 116 
 
 
8.3.4 This Study’s Contribution 
This study mainly focuses on the effects of trade liberalization on intra-industry 
resource reallocation, the third source of gains from trade.    The extensive margin - 
hypothesis that a decrease in variable trade costs raises the probability of firm 
(establishment) exit is first tested.    Using establishment death data on 1998-2009 
from Business Dynamics Database and Survey of U.S. Business, and trade costs 
computed in Chapter 2, estimation results show that as trade costs fall, establishment 
death becomes more likely.    This relationship appears robust to a number of 
controls used in the estimation.    Focusing on disaggregated data, this study finds 
that establishment death is more likely when trade costs fall in a majority of 
three-digit NAICS industries.    Those industries include food products, textile and 
fabrics, plastics and rubber products, metal manufacturing, and transportation 
equipment.  In high-end manufacturing, however, there is not statistical support for 
such a relationship.    This is presumably due to the role of innovation and 
technology in those industries. So, this study suggests that low-productivity firms are 
likely exiting when international competition increases in the U.S. market.    This 
result has implications for average productivity in U.S. industries.    However, 
changing trade costs appear to have little effects on establishment birth, i.e., new 
business opportunities.     
The intensive-margin hypothesis is also tested, specifically, the idea that 117 
 
 
employment of expanding and surviving firms (establishments) increases in response 
to declining trade costs, while the employment of contracting and surviving firms 
(establishments) decreases in response to declining trade costs.    The BDS and 
SUSB databases, and trade costs from Chapter 2, are used in identifying these effects.   
The estimation results indicate that when trade costs fall, the ratio of jobs lost or 
destroyed to total employment in contracting and surviving firms tends to increase.   
At the same time, falling trade costs create jobs in expanding and surviving 
establishments.    However, these two effects tend to cancel each other out.  This 
may explain why a significant effect of trade costs on net job creation is not found 
during 1998-2009.     
In sum, strong evidence of the extensive margin changes suggests international 
competition disciplines domestic industry in raising the level of productivity 
required to survive in the market.    Within surviving firms, the results suggest that 
trade costs’ effects create and destroy some jobs, leaving net job creation unaffected.   
While these changes are beneficial to the whole economy, i.e. increased productivity, 
some regions face establishment exit and job losses.    So, the assessment of gains 
from trade should be mindful of the distributional consequences of resource 
reallocation within an industry, as well as within a country.   118 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 9 
9. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
   119 
 
 
The objective of this dissertation is to examine U.S. business dynamics – firm entry, 
exit, and job creation – arising from changes in the costs of trading among nations.   
In doing so, this study recognizes that U.S. trade with its partners occurs through a 
large number of and diverse set of sub-regions within the U.S.    Therefore, a single 
measure of trade costs for the entire United States, and a national level examination of 
business dynamics, would mask important regional differences and equity 
considerations.    For this purpose, a gravity-based measure of trade costs is extended, 
based on a general equilibrium framework, to a regional setting in U.S. agricultural 
and manufacturing industries during 1998-2009.    Following the measurement of 
trade costs, and an examination of their determinants (policy, geographic, and 
institutional factors), the consequences for firm entry, exit and job creation are 
estimated.   
With regard to trade costs, the empirical results show significant heterogeneity 
among three-digit NAICS level U.S. industries, major U.S. customs districts and U.S. 
trade partners during 1998-2009.    Among industries, the relative trade costs of U.S. 
agricultural industries are significantly higher than those in the manufacturing sector 
(over 200 versus about 145 percent of domestic trade costs).    For most U.S. 
industries, relative trade costs fell during 1998-2001, but increased between 2002 and 
2009 coinciding with the change in regulatory environment following 2001.    The U.S. 
customs districts closer to the Canadian or Mexican border tend to have lower relative 120 
 
 
trade costs, e.g. Buffalo, New York and El Paso, Texas.    In addition, inland customs 
districts such as St. Louis, Missouri, generally face higher trade barriers than port 
cities.    Again, relative trade costs of major U.S. customs districts declined during 
1998-2001, but showed significant increases during 2002-2009.    Among U.S. trade 
partners, Canada and Mexico have the lowest weighted average trade costs (less than 
125 percent of domestic trade costs).    Both geographic (distance and common border) 
and policy factors (NAFTA) appear to have contributed to lower relative trade costs 
with Canada and Mexico.    China’s trade costs with the United States are about twice 
that of Canada or Mexico, but only two-thirds of most developed countries from 
Europe (e.g. Germany, France).   
With substantial spatial and industrial variation in relative trade costs, an 
investigation of underlying sources – policy, geographic and institutional factors – is 
undertaken.    A cross-sectional regression equation is used to relate 2005 trade costs 
(indexed by industry, U.S. customs district, trade partner) to geographic factors 
(distance, common border, landlocked status), policy (tariff rate) and institutional 
factors (common language, logistics performance).    GMM estimation procedures are 
used.    A similar equation is specified with the 2005-2009 weighted average of trade 
costs as the dependent variable.    Results from the above specifications show that 
distance has a significant and positive impact on trade costs.    Sharing a common 
border, on the other hand, lowers trade costs.    The foreign country’s or U.S. tariff rate 121 
 
 
does not significantly affect U.S. trade costs in the base specification.    However, 
removing countries with very high tariffs (rates higher than 2 standard deviation of the 
global average) from the sample changes this result - foreign country tariffs have a 
positive and statistically significant effect on U.S. trade costs.    The results on the 
logistics performance index show that the longer the time taken by a foreign country 
to process import documents, the higher is its trade costs with the United States.     
The elasticity of trade costs with respect to distance, tariff rate, logistics 
performance and other explanatory variables are evaluated at the sample average.   
Results show that distance has the largest elasticity, followed by that of logistics 
performance.    The tariff elasticity is very small relative to that of distance and 
logistics performance.    The finding that geographic factors outweigh policy/tariff 
impacts on trade costs or frictions is no surprisingly, as it is consistent with previous 
cross-country studies.    Tariff rates are generally not extremely high, due to earlier 
waves of trade liberalization.    Distance and logistics performance at the regional 
level appears to be quite important.    It would seem that infrastructure investments, 
both domestic as well as international, are likely to bring about continued reductions 
in trade costs and improvements in competitive market conditions. 
To investigate business dynamics, an empirical framework was developed to 
investigate: (i) firm entry or exit arising from changes in trade costs, i.e. extensive 
margin, and (ii) changes in the employment of surviving firms arising from changes 122 
 
 
in trade costs, i.e., the intensive margin.  Trade costs measures, developed earlier, 
are  employed  to  examine  business  dynamics  and  resource  reallocation.    The 
regression models concern establishment birth, death, job destruction, job expansion, 
and net job creation. Firm-level and market characteristics such as size, age, wage 
level,  multi-establishment  status,  and  market  size  are  also  included  as  control 
variables. 
A key result is that establishment death is more likely when trade costs fall.   
This finding is robust across specifications and under alternative measures of trade 
costs.    With respect to other characteristics, it appears that larger, older and more 
productive establishments are more likely to survive.    Furthermore, establishments 
that are part of a large, multi-unit firm face relatively lower risk of closure.    Also, 
establishments  located  in  a  large  market  are  more  likely  survive  due  to 
agglomeration economies.    The test of the extensive margin hypothesis is extended 
to  each  major  U.S.  three-digit  NAICS  industry.    The  estimation  results  of 
establishment  death  by  industry  shows  substantial  variation.  In  relatively  more 
competitive and low-tech industries, such as apparel and accessories, and primary 
metal manufacturing, trade costs play a critical role in business dynamics. On the 
contrary, in high-end manufacturing, it is innovation, management and other factors 
that  appear  more  relevant  to  the  success  of  business.    Trade  costs  changes  are 
muted in those industries with respect to extension margin.    This study finds little 123 
 
 
evidence of effects of changing trade costs on the birth of establishments, i.e. new 
business opportunities.     
With regard to the intensive margin hypothesis, the effects of trade costs on job 
creation  is  examined  in  three  steps:  (i)  surviving  but  contracting  firms  –  job 
destruction, and (ii) surviving but  expanding  firms  –  job  expansion, and (iii) all 
surviving  firms  –  net  job  creation.  The  set  of  establishment  and  market 
characteristics in the establishment birth/death equations are also included in the job 
creation models.    The estimation results indicate that falling trade costs increase job 
destruction.    This result remains robust across specifications and under alternative 
trade costs measures.    Second, there is some evidence that falling trade costs result 
in job expansion by continuing firms, but the result is not robust under alternative 
trade costs measures.    Finally, the above two offsetting effects on job destruction 
and expansion is likely the reason that net job creation is unaffected by changing 
trade costs.       
Viewing the entire set of results on business dynamics, it appears that 
international competition disciplines domestic industry, by raising the level of 
productivity required to survive in the market, via the extensive margin changes.   
However, net job creation of surviving firms remains unaffected likely due to trade 
cost effects in creating some jobs and destroying other jobs.    As noted in the 
previous chapter, the intra-industry reallocation of resources to high productivity 124 
 
 
firms is a source of gains from trade to the whole economy.    Nonetheless, some 
regions face firm/establishment exit and job losses.    In assessing the gains from 
trade, attention must be paid to the distributional consequences of resource 
reallocation within an industry as well as a country. 
Future research may focus on improved measures of trade costs by regions, e.g. 
export and import costs, for a longer time period than considered in this study.   
Moreover, the availability of establishment level data on a time-series basis, 
especially inputs, outputs and exports, should allow for further confirmation of trade 
costs’ effects on business dynamics: firm entry, exit and employment changes.   
Spatial econometric techniques can then help measure the extent of spatial 
reallocation of resources within an industry, which should help address the design of 
policies to address distributional consequences of trade reform.    125 
 
 
ENDNOTES 
________________________ 
1 The list of 25 three-digit NAICS industries, 38 major U.S. customs districts and 72 
foreign countries appear in Table 2, 3 and 4, respectively. 
 
2 The level is derived using equation (2.21), i.e. the ratio on the right hand side of 
equation (2.21).   
 
3 i, j, and s denote U.S. region, foreign country, and industry, respectively. 
 
4 The minimum for many of the listed variables is not exactly zero but a few 
thousand dollars. 
 
5 
*Common border, common language, and landlocked are dummy variables. 
 
 
6 For a description of the MAcMAPHS6 database, see 
http://www.ifpri.org/book-5078/ourwork/program/macmap-hs6 and Bounellassa 
et al. (2009). 
 
7 http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm. 
 
8 Port-specific data are not available to infer on the asymmetric effects of U.S. and 
foreign country’s logistics performance on trade costs as in the case of tariffs. 
The DistrictDummy likely alleviates some of this problem. 
 
9 Both tariffs and importer’s average time for all procedures do not vary over time.   
Hence,  the  2006  importer’s  average  time  for  all  procedures  is  used  in  the 
regression of 2005 trade costs.    As shown later, results from using 2005 trade 
costs as the dependent variable are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to 
those  from  the  second  specification  employing  2005-2009  weighted  average 
trade costs. 
 
10 Recall that the DistrictDummy includes some of these effects for the United States. 
 
11 The effect of trade costs on firm entry, exit, and employment pattern will then be 
examined via empirical regression models provided in chapter seven. 
 
12 The model of heterogeneous firms mainly considers trade-induced effects within a 
narrowly defined industry 
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13 The primary sources of data, Business Dynamics Statistics and Statistics of U.S. 
Business, are at the establishment-level. The business here is considered at the 
establishment-level. 
 
14 http://www.census.gov/ces/dataproducts/bds/ 
 
15 http://www.census.gov/econ/susb/ 
 
16 Two  alternative  trade  costs  series  are  referred  to  1998-2009  trade  costs  and 
2008-2009 trade costs. The former trade costs primarily focus on 28 U.S. states 
that have customs districts. The latter trade costs include all 48 contingent U.S. 
states. 
 
17 The fixed effects for year and region are added into regression models for model 
accuracy, which account for difference in the response variable among regions 
and years after controlling for independent variables. 
 
18 In Logistic regression, likelihood ratio test is used to compare a full model and a 
reduced model. The null hypothesis is that the reduced model is an adequate fit 
to data, i.e. the coefficients associated with extra explanatory variables are zero. 
 
19 The effect of changing trade costs on business dynamics is examined individually 
in  each  major  U.S.  three-digit  NAICS  industry  using  the  Statistics  of  U.S. 
Business database. Due to the data constrains, 24 three-digit NAICS industries 
are included. 
 
20 Haltiwanger et al.(2010) address that business startups and young businesses play 
a  relatively  critical  role  in  both  U.S.  gross  and  net  job  creation  rather  than 
businesses with large size. 
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In the theoretical model, the industry-specific trade costs by regions are assumed to 
be symmetric.    In the appendix, that assumption is relaxed to derive measures of 
import trade costs and export trade costs for each U.S. region. 
 
Model Setup 
The measurement of bilateral trade costs between U.S. regions and their trade 
partners is the extension of Novy’s model
1. Trade costs are solved through a multiple 
region-country  general  equilibrium  system  of  the  micro-founded  gravity  model. 
Assume that the home country contains multiple regions, and all the other countries 
are only endowed with one region. The range of all consumers and products in the 
world is the continuum [0, 1]. The country j (j=1, 2…J) has the range of differentiate 
varieties [nj-1,nj], and each of them is produced by a single firm. Within the product 
range,  [nj-1, nj-1+sj(nj-nj-1)]  is  tradable,  and  the  remaining  part  is  non-tradable.  sj 
denotes the fraction of tradable products as exogenous. All the tradable products can 
be  consumed  by  the  entire  world,  but  the  non-tradable  cannot  be  traded  across 
countries.  For  each  region  of  the  home  country,  there  are  three  categories: 
international tradable products: [nr-1, nr-1+sr,i(nr-nr-1)], inter-state tradable products: 
[nr-1+sr,i(nr-nr-1), nr-1+ (sr,i+sr,s)(nr-nr-1)],  and  non-tradable  products:  [nr-1+ (sr,i+sr,s) 
(nr-nr-1),  nr]
2.  Here  sr,i  and  sr,s  represent  the  share  of  international  tradable  and 
regional tradable, respectively. The iceberg-type trade costs τ r, j incurs during the 136 
 
 
transportation process from country to country, which implies that for each unit of 
product i, a certain percentage melts away
 as if an iceberg were shipped across the 
ocean
3. 
 
Consumer 
Followed by Dixit and Stiglitz’ model, the CES composite consumption index 
for region r is defined as   
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where cri denotes per capital consumption of variety i, and σ denotes the elasticity of 
substitution between varieties. Maximizing (A.1) subject to the per-capita budget 
constraint
4, the individual demand of product i is as follows, 
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where Pr denotes the consumption-based price index defined by 
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In  the  price  index,  ξri  denotes  the  c.i.f.  (cost,  insurance,  freight)  price  of  the 
individual product i, defined as follows
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pj,i
T  denotes  the  f.o.b.  (free  on  board)  price  produced  by  country  j  firm  i.  The 
iceberg-type trade costs incur through the above equations, since the fraction  τr, j 
melts away during shipping process. In order to simplify the model, the interregional 
bilateral  trade  costs  are  ignored,  thus  τk,r is  equal  to  zero.  This  assumption  is  a 
normalization which is also used by Baier and Bergstrand (2003). 
 
Firms 
Assume  all  the  firms  face  a  constant-returns-to-scale  production  function,  where 
labor is the only input factor. Therefore, the production function is 
      , , , , , , , , , , (A.7)             ;       ;     
T T ST ST NT NT
r i j r r i j r i k r r i k r i r r i y A L y A L y A L     
where Ar is exogenous and region-specific technology, the same across tradable and 
non-tradable sectors; yr,i,j
T, yr,i,k 
ST, and yr,i
NT denote the total output produced by an 
individual  firm  in  the  international  tradable  sector,  interregional  tradable  and 
non-tradable sector, respectively.   
 
 138 
 
 
Market Equilibrium 
By the market clearing condition, the total output should equal the total consumption. 
Hence the three equations for yr,i,j
T, yr,i,k 
ST, and yr,i
NT   are as follows, 
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In addition, the profit function is defined by total revenue minus total cost   
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Plugging  the  production  function  and  market  clearing  conditions  into  the  profit 
function, and maximizing it with respect to the individual price, the prices in three 
sectors are equal, 
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Using (A.12) to recalculate the consumption-based price index (A.3), the consumer 
price index at region r is rewritten as,   
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A Gravity Equation with Bilateral Trade Costs 
Define the total export from region r to country j and total export from country j to 
region r as   
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The ratios of ωr and ωj, of ωr and ωk are, 
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Plug (A.16) and (A.17) into (A.18), the expression of ωr can be simplified as 
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Finally, the bilateral trade volumes between region r and country j are obtained by 
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Furthermore, notice that (nr-nr-1) and (nj-nj-1) can be represented by the population of 
region r and country j, respectively, and 
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Recalculate the equations of export volume 
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And solve for the bilateral trade costs, 
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Note that in the equations of region r’s export and import trade costs, the extreme 
large difference between the import and export  volume will incur unstable trade 
costs measures. When using the U.S. regional trade flow data, this situation always 141 
 
 
happens.   
 
ENDNOTES 
________________________ 
1 D. Novy. 2007. “Is the Iceberg Melting Less Quickly? International Trade Costs 
after World War II.” University of Warwick: working paper. 
 
2 Note: nr-1, nr are actually nr-1, J+1, nr, J+1, here we just ignore J+1. 
 
3 τJ, r, j is less than one unit. 
 
4 The budget constraint is PrCr=WrLr+πr, where Wr denotes wage, and πr denotes the 
profit per capita.
 